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Abstract
The terrorist attacks undertaken by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization on the morning of
September 11, 2001 ushered in a new era of indiscriminate global terrorism characterized by an
unprecedented focus on security, risk management, and business continuity. The probability of
future attacks, coupled with government response to the threat, has introduced myriad new
challenges that virtually every manufacturer, distributor, and retailer engaged in global
commerce must now face. This thesis will explore and analyze the impact that the "new"
terrorist threat has, and will continue to have, on the supply chains of those manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers by studying relevant historical disruptions; in essence, looking to the
past to glean important insights as to how enterprises can best prepare for the future.
Throughout history, numerous disruptive events have occurred that bear comparison to a
potential terrorist attack. These events include earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, industrial
accidents, and labor strikes, as well as other terrorist attacks. By studying such events in detail
and understanding the impact that they had on the supply chains of companies that were affected,
important lessons can be learned regarding how best to prepare for, and react to, future
disruptions. This thesis project ultimately seeks to collect, analyze, and synthesize historical
data with the goal of presenting insights and conclusions that can be applied by businesses in the
current operating environment to best prepare their supply chains for future disruptions, whether
natural or man-made.
All research results are organized and presented in terms of the nature of the specific supply
chain disruption (key supplier down, transportation capability disrupted, etc.), as opposed to the
nature, location, or other defining characteristics of the disaster itself. Conclusions consist of a
discussion of the unifying themes and the relevant lessons learned. The thesis then goes on to
recommend ten prescriptive measures that organizations can take in today's business
environment to strengthen their supply chains, minimize their exposure to future disruptions, and
maximize their operational resilience.
Thesis Advisor: Yossi Sheffi
Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Professor of Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 September 11, 2001: A New Age of Global Terrorism
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the world changed. A well-planned and highly
organized strike - involving the simultaneous hijacking of four U.S. commercial airliners - was
directed at multiple targets in New York City and Washington D.C. It was the worst
international terrorist attack ever attempted on U.S. soil in modern history. And for all intents
and purposes, it was very successful. Two of the planes struck and toppled the twin towers of
New York City's World Trade Center - one was flown into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. -
and the third crashed, many believe prematurely, in a grassy field in rural Pennsylvania. The
U.S. government's response was immediate and far-reaching. Uncertain as to the likelihood of
additional attacks that may have already been in progress, air traffic was grounded and security
at border crossings was tightened to an unprecedented level. Until it could be determined that
the skies and roads were safe, the airports remained closed and the borders remained clogged
with trucks waiting to cross into the U.S. from Canada or Mexico to deliver their goods. For
many businesses, the proverbial wheels of commerce were brought to a grinding halt. And for
most of these companies, it was not the effects of the attack itself that disrupted their operations;
it was the U.S. government's response to the attack that did the most damage.
1.2 The Threat: How did we get here?
Terrorist attacks, natural disasters, political upheaval, and industrial accidents are nothing new -
most as old as commerce itself But events like the Year 2000 (Y2K) computer upgrade frenzy,
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and even the West Coast port lock-out in the summer of 2002 have
brought the risks to the forefront of global consciousness. It is not that disruptive events are
necessarily occurring with any greater frequency or magnitude, but that enterprises now find
themselves increasingly vulnerable to their effects. For the past two decades, there have been
two major trends at work that have led to this new reality: Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing and
rapid globalization.
The trend towards lean JIT manufacturing practices, adopted from the Japanese in the 1980s, has
resulted in the evolution of very efficient, but very fragile supply networks. One of the goals of
JIT is to minimize the level of raw materials, work-in-process (WIP), and finished goods
inventory levels throughout the chain, which reduces the level of capital investment required,
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freeing up that cash to more profitably allocate elsewhere. This means that firms will often carry
only a day or two, much less in some industries, of inventory at various manufacturing locations.
When parts deliveries are made as planned, the system functions beautifully. When the flow of
goods is disrupted however, there is little, if anything, to prevent a major system interruption.
Even minor delays can have a significant impact on downstream operations. And as enterprises
regress towards leaner and leaner inventory levels, network supply chains are only left more and
more vulnerable.
The increasingly global nature of business, combined with a prevailing trend towards
outsourcing many activities once considered critical to ongoing operations, has also aggravated
the situation. To take advantage of geographic cost advantages - proximity to markets,
proximity to raw material sources, and low labor costs for example - enterprises have extended
their supply networks on an unprecedented scale. For example, many companies have chosen to
locate their manufacturing operations, whether internal or outsourced to a third-party, in China
and along the Pacific Rim to exploit the relatively low cost of labor. While certainly offering
significant savings in direct labor costs, this also exposes a company to new risks. Any number
of potential supply chain disruptions can directly impact that company's ability to get their
products to market in a timely and cost-efficient manner. And the greater the complexity (i.e.
the number of nodes) and geographic dispersion (i.e. the distance spanned) of the supply
network, the more vulnerable it tends to be to disruption. Figure 1.0 on the following page
illustrates this efficiency vs. resiliency tradeoff that, often unnoticed until recently, has
underpinned these trends over the last twenty years.
1.3 The MIT SCRT Research Initiative
In response to the new era of indiscriminate global terrorism ushered in on the morning of
September 11, 2001, a research project was initiated by the MIT Center for Transportation and
Logistics to examine the new challenges facing virtually every manufacturer, distributor, and
retailer that participates in global commerce. The Supply Chain Response to Terrorism (SCRT)
research project was chartered to explore and analyze the impact that the "new" terrorist threat
has, and will continue to have, on the extended supply chains of those manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers.
8
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1.4 Importance of the Research
Throughout history, numerous disruptive events have occurred that bear comparison to a
potential terrorist attack. These events include previous terrorist attacks, natural disasters,
industrial accidents, cyber attacks, and labor strikes. By studying such events in detail and
understanding the impact that they had on the supply chains of companies that were affected,
important lessons can be learned regarding how best to prepare for, and react to, future
disruptions. This thesis will contribute to the SCRT initiative by looking to the past to glean
important insights as to how enterprises can best prepare for the future.
1.5 Research Goals
The core research question(s) that this thesis seeks to address are:
> What, specifically, was the impact of the disruption to the supply chain or business
operations of the affected enterprises?
> How did they react and/or recover (or not)?




This thesis project ultimately seeks to collect, analyze, and synthesize historical data with the
goal of presenting insights and conclusions that can be applied by businesses in the current
operating environment to best prepare their supply chains for future disruptions, whether natural
or man-made.
1.6 Scope
The focus of this thesis is on past events that had a significant disabling affect on one or more
supply chain nodes or functions of a given company or industry. For the purposes of this study,
all events are of either a physical, financial, or labor-related nature and were selected with the
goal of providing a broad base of data from which to compare and contrast their respective
impact on affected supply chains. For, as this thesis will show, although the root causes of the
disruptions may vary, the effects on the supply chains that they interrupt often do not. This
means that a single general resiliency strategy can be implemented to minimize a supply chain's
exposure to a wide range of potential disruptions. Please note that a similar 2003 MLog thesis
project, titled Historical Events and Supply Chain Disruption: Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Cyber Events by Reshma P. Lensing, was conducted in parallel and focuses on
disruptions of a cyber/digital, chemical, biological, or radiological nature.
1.6.1 Scope of Past Disruptive Events
The events that were studied as a part of this thesis can be grouped into the following categories:
earthquakes, severe weather, floods, fires, port explosions, terrorist attacks, labor strikes, and
financial distress. Table 1.0, shown on the following page, provides an outline of the disruptive
events that are discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.
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Table 1.0 - Scope of Disruptive Events
Kobe Earthquake Earthquake 01/16/95
Taiwan Earthquake Earthquake 09/22/99
Hurricane Andrew Severe Weather 08/16/92
Quebec Ice Storm Severe Weather 01/18/98
Hurricane Mitch Severe Weather 10/22/98
1993 Mississippi Flood Flood Summer/93
Seven Building Flood Flood 01/06/02
Central European Floods Flood Summer/02
Toyota P-Valve Supplier Plant Fire Fire 02/01/97
Avon Rubber & Plastics Plant Fire Fire 04/02/99
Philips Plant Fire Fire 03/17/00
Mont Blanc Port Explosion Port Explosion 12/06/17
Texas City Disaster Port Explosion 04/16/47
1993 WTC Bombing Terrorist Attack 02/26/93
Oklahoma City Bombing Terrorist Attack 04/16/95
9/11 Terrorist Attacks Terrorist Attack 09/11/01
1997 UPS Strike Labor Strike 08/04/97
1998 General Motors Strike Labor Strike 06/05/98
West Coast Port Lockout Labor Strike/Lockout 09/29/02
UPF-Thompson Bankruptcy Financial Distress 12/15/01
1.6.2 Scope of Case Studies
In addition to the disruptive events outlined in Table 1.0 on the previous page, several cases
where actual companies were faced with supply chain resiliency challenges were also included
within the research scope of this thesis. All cases identified in Table 2.0, shown on the following
page, pertain to one or more company's specific response to one of the past disruptions listed in
Table 1.0 and discussed in Chapter 4. All cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
11
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Table 2.0 - Scope of Case Studies
Oklahoma FECU Oklahoma City Bombing Non-IT Infrastructure
New York Board of Trade 9/11 Terrorist Attacks Non-IT Infrastructure
Seven Asset Management Seven Building Flood IT Infrastructure
ING Canada Property & Casualty Quebec Ice Storm IT Infrastructure
Merrill Lynch 9/11 Terrorist Attacks IT Infrastructure
Sidley Austen Brown, & Wood 9/11 Terrorist Attacks IT Infrastructure
Dole Vs. Chiquita Hurricane Mitch Supply Base
Dell Vs. Apple Taiwan Earthquake Supply Base
Nokia Vs. Ericsson Philips Plant Fire Supply Base
Land Rover UPF-Thompson Bankruptcy Supply Base
Toyota Motor Corp. P-Valve Supplier Plant Fire Supply Base
Unilever Hurricane Mitch Manufacturing
Compaq n/a Manufacturing
Avon Rubber & Plastics Avon Plant Fire Manufacturing
Rocket USA Inc. 1997 UPS Strike Transportation
Continental Teves 9/11 Terrorist Attacks Transportation
Ford Vs. Daimler-Chrysler 9/11 Terrorist Attacks Transportation
Toyota/GM NUMMI Shutdown West Coast Port Lockout Transportation
Dow Coming Corp. 2003 U.S.-Iraq War Transportation
GHSP 9/11 Terrorist Attacks Demand Disruption
Cantor Fitzgerald 9/11 Terrorist Attacks Demand Disruption
As each of the disruptive events (Table 1.0) was studied, additional research focused on those
companies that were impacted, either directly or indirectly, as follows:
Direct Impact:
A firm's own physical assets were disabled or destroyed:
> Manufacturing capability
> Distribution capability (Warehouses, Distribution Centers, Private Fleets, etc.)
> Other assets or employees (Sales office, etc.)
Indirect Impact:
Assets of supply chain partners or were disabled or destroyed:
> Suppliers
> Contract Manufacturers
> Transportation/Distribution Service Providers





> Caused by the event itself (roads destroyed, ports closed, etc.)
> Caused by response to event (border closings, etc.)
Affected companies were studied further to explore:
> How, specifically, were their supply chains or general business operations affected?
> What was the short-term and long-term impact of the disruption?
> How prepared were they?
> How did they react and recover (or not)?
> What lessons can be learned from their experiences?
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Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Data Sources and Research Methods
The data collection and analysis methodology employed for this project consisted primarily of
library and internet-based research, and was supplemented with brief interviews and/or
additional research methods as was deemed both useful and feasible.
2.2 Thesis Framework/Structure
A primary theme of this thesis is that it is important to focus not necessarily on the nature of a
disruption, but on how business operations are likely to be impacted. Thus, organizations should
focus on the failure modes, not the failures themselves. Firms cannot foresee every potential
threat, let alone the probability of it occurring at each point in a complex and rapidly expanding
supply network. It simply isn't feasible, nor would it be practical. For example, before
September 1 l, 2001, a company could not realistically have been expected to plan for a plane
hitting its building. Luckily, firms should not have to. As this study will show, a wide variety of
disruptions tend to have very similar effects on a company's supply chain. Therefore, the
examples and cases discussed in Chapter 5 are organized and presented by the nature of their
impact on the supply chain, or by the ways in which a supply chain can generally break or fail.
These are referred to as a supply chain's failure modes. The failure modes identified and used
in this study are listed below in Table 3.0 below and are described in further detail in Chapter 5.
Table 3.0 - Common Failure Modes
Failure Mode Descriptin
Non-IT Physical Infrastructure Loss of non-IT related assets like staff, office locations, etc
IT Assets/Infrastructure Data loss, communication links so supply chain partners, etc
Key Supplier Ability to source a key component, etc.
Manufacturing Capability Ability to produce goods and/or services for sale
Capability Ability to move raw materials or finished goods throughout
Distribution/Transportation Cthe supply chain
Key Customer Loss of one or more key customers
14
Chapter 3: Literature Review
3.1 Summary Overview of Relevant Published Research
The focus of this thesis is on historical events that had a significant disabling affect on one or
more supply chain nodes or functions of a given company or industry. For the purposes of this
study, all events are of either a physical, financial, or labor-related nature and were selected with
the goal of providing a broad base of data from which to compare and contrast their respective
impact on affected supply chains. So with this focus solely on past events, it is important to note
that all data was collected from previously published works. A vast majority of data came from
publications that were written with one of the following two purposes:
1. To explore the subject of general supply chain resiliency or security, or
2. To review a specific disruptive event and/or its effect on a specific company
While the numerous publications written with the purpose of reviewing a specific event (2) were
certainly useful in understanding their particular topics, the real value to the subject of supply
chain resiliency was realized only when analyzing them in the context of other events. By
evaluating the aggregate body of disruption data, several important insights and unifying themes
were identified, which are detailed in Chapter 6.
In contrast, the publications written to explore the subject of general supply chain resiliency (1),
while far fewer in number, were extremely important in guiding the research for this thesis and
providing a basis from which to extend the current body of knowledge. While only three
publications fell into this category, all were invaluable to the author and are summarized below.
> Sheffi, Y. (2001). Supply Chain Management under the Threat of International Terrorism,
International Journal of Logistics Management, v. 12, no. 2.
Dr. Sheffi's paper was the catalyst for MIT's Supply Chain Response to Terrorism (SCRT)
research initiative and for this thesis project specifically, which his is also the faculty advisor for.
The paper looks at the dual corporate challenges of preparing to deal with the aftermath of
terrorist attacks and operating under a new steady state of heightened security. The first
challenge relates to setting certain operational redundancies. The second implies less reliable
lead times and less certain demand scenarios. Dr. Sheffi's paper also discusses ways by which
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companies should organize to meet those challenges efficiently and goes on to suggest a new
public-private partnership. Specifically, the paper identifies and explores the following
tradeoffs:
> Efficiency Vs. Redundancy
> Collaboration Vs. Secrecy
> Centralization Vs. Dispersion
> Lowest Bidder Vs. Known Supplier
> Security Vs. Privacy
> Martha, J. & Vratimos, E. (2002). Creating a Just-in-Case Supply Chain for the Inevitable
Next Disaster. Viewpoint Magazine, no. 2. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.
> Martha, J. & Subbakrishna, S. (2002, September 1). Targeting a Just-in-Case Strategy for
The Next Inevitable Disaster. Supply Chain Management Review.
The Martha & Vratimos and Martha & Subbakrishna papers address the subject of supply chain
resiliency from a more disruption-agnostic perspective, much as this thesis does. Both draw
attention to the notion that natural disasters, wars, and political upheavals occur regularly around
the globe, but only recently was supply chain risk brought to the forefront of corporate
consciousness. Only when the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon caused widespread transportation delays, resulting in costly inventory shortages
and plant shutdowns for many U.S. manufacturers and goods shortages for many retailers, did
firms finally begin to understand the vulnerabilities of the modem networked supply chain. The
papers also go on to identify the trend towards lean Just-in-Time manufacturing and logistics
practices as a contributing factor to the resiliency issue.
Additionally, both papers briefly discuss various real-world examples of companies that were
faced with major supply chain disruptions. In fact, several of the case studies included in this
thesis are based on cases identified in this paper. These include, among others:
> Dell Vs. Apple
> Dole Vs. Chiquita
> Continental-Teves
> Daimler-Chrysler Vs. Ford
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> Helferich, 0. & Cook, R. (2002). Securing the Supply Chain. Council of Logistics
Management Research Report.
This report, sponsored by the Council of Logistics Management, was also triggered by the events
of September 11th and encompasses the general issues of preparedness and response and goes on
to provide a classification of major events that are likely to disrupt supply chain performance.
Dr. Helferich and Dr. Cook introduce a resiliency analysis framework that can be summarized
as:
Planning 4 Mitigation 4 Detection - Response - Recovery
As the authors explain, the process begins with preparing the enterprise and the supply chain for
the unforeseen event-disaster through development of formal "planning". Preparedness includes
defining actions to reduce the impact of a disaster, referred to as "mitigation". The next stage in
the preparedness process is "Detection", which is necessary given that some disasters such as
release of biological agents are not easily identified until medical symptoms appear. "Response"
involves preparing for the actions that will be taken by enterprise employees, the general
community, the emergency first responders, and emergency relief. The final stage involves
executing a strategy to resume normal business and community functions called "recovery".
The overall objective of the paper is to develop a planning framework and provide the
supplemental tools that will assist the supply chain continuity management team through each
stage of the disaster management process.
Lensing, R. (2003). Historical Events and Supply Chain Disruption: Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Cyber Events. (Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
2003).
An additional source of information that was used to help shape the direction of the research was
another 2003 MLog thesis project, undertaken by Reshma P. Lensing, that focuses on disruptions
of a cyber/digital, chemical, biological, and/or radiological nature. The Lensing paper and this
thesis were developed in parallel and are designed to provide a comprehensive view of supply
chain resiliency under a broad array of potentially disruptive conditions.
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Chapter 4: Survey of Past Disruptions
4.1 Overview
The disruptive events that were studied as a part of this thesis can be grouped into the following
categories: earthquakes, severe weather, floods, fires, port explosions, terrorist attacks, labor
strikes, and financial distress. All vary significantly by frequency, magnitude, and scope, but in
many cases, tend to affect the supply chains of affected companies in very similar ways. For
example, it will not matter much to a large auto manufacturer whether the flow of components
from a key supplier was disrupted by an earthquake, a plant fire, or a government-imposed
border closing. What matters is that the flow of those components was compromised and now
that auto manufacturer must respond to minimize the impact of the disruption on their
operations. They must be resilient regardless of the root cause.
4.2 Earthquakes
The destructive power of an earthquake can be awesome. In just seconds, it can topple
buildings, collapse bridges, and destroy roads. And while a company's general exposure to
earthquake risk can be predicted to some degree by the proximity of supply chain nodes to
known fault lines or areas of geological instability, the factors that influence earthquake
frequency and magnitude are still a relative mystery. There is no early warning system. And
given the relative infrequent nature of major quakes, there are often many benefits from locating
a supply chain node in a seismically active region that justify the risk. The Pacific Rim, for
example, is a known earthquake hot-spot yet low costs of labor and other factors have attracted
billions of investment dollars used to build manufacturing capacity in the region. But while the
risk of an earthquake is not normally sufficient in and of itself to direct investment decisions, a
prudent company should be aware of its general exposure and have a plan in place should
disaster strike.
To determine one's earthquake risk, geographic location is the primary driver. Companies that
have operating assets near seismically active areas are much more vulnerable than companies
that do not. And as the historical data summarized in Figure 3.0 on the following page shows,
the active areas are fairly well delineated from the inactive areas. Figure 4.0 goes on to attribute
a degree of earthquake risk to every region within the United States according to known seismic
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activity. This map was developed with the assistance of the U.S. construction industry and the
rating system was, in part, influenced by national U.S. building codes and the known
vulnerabilities of structures built under those codes to specific types of earthquake activity.
According the U.S. Geological Survey, similar maps have not yet been developed for areas
outside the United States. However, for a summary of significant earthquake activity in the U.S.,
Europe, and the Pacific Rim from 1975 - 1995, please reference Figures 39.0 - 41.0 in the
Appendix. All data was sourced from the U.S. Geological Survey (2003).
Once a company understands its likely exposure to earthquake risk, it can then incorporate that
into its general supply chain resiliency strategy. And to better understand what the potential
impact of such a disruption could be, the 1995 Kobe, Japan and 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan
earthquakes were studied in detail as a part of this thesis and are profiled in the following pages.
Figure 2.0 - Significant Worldwide Earthquakes: 2150 B.C. - A.D. 1994
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Figure 3.0 - U.S. Seismic Hazard Map
Source: USGS, http://igeohazards.cr.usgs.gov/eq/html/graphics.html
4.2.1 Taiwan Earthquake - 09/21/99 - Chi-Chi, Taiwan
At 1:47 a.m. on September 21, 1999, an earthquake struck Taiwan with a destructive force that
registered 7.6 on the Richter scale. Its epicenter was approximately 7 km northwest of Chi-Chi,
a small town bordering a mountainous resort area, and located 155 km from the capital city of
Taipei. The ground shook severely for 40 seconds and was felt throughout the entire island. In
the subsequent days, several large aftershocks followed - four with a magnitude greater than 6.5.
This, the Chi-Chi earthquake was the most devastating to hit Taiwan since a 7.1 quake struck the
Hsinchu-Taichung region in 1953, killing over 3,500 people.
The earthquake toppled structures, including two tall buildings 150 km north in Taipei, and
generated numerous landslides throughout the areas surrounding the epicenter. And to
complicate the rescue and recovery efforts, numerous road sections (see Figure 5.0) were heavily
damaged by the landslides and the shifting of the ground at major fault lines. When the dust
settled, the death toll had exceeded 2,400 and over 10,700 people had been injured. Over 8,500
buildings were destroyed and another 6,200 were significantly damaged.
There was also a significant level of business disruption due to an island-wide power outage.
An RMS Research note (2000) reported that while overall economic losses topped $12B, a
significant portion of the $600M in insurance claims came from business interruption losses
associated with the power outage. The Hsingchu Science Park, located 110km from the
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epicenter, suffered some of the most significant damage. Hsingchu is the site of the Science
Based Industrial Park, a major development where roughly 30 companies provide a significant
percentage of the total global semiconductor manufacturing and silicon processing. The
overwhelming problem caused by the earthquake was a loss of electrical power rather than any
significant structural damage. As described in an EQE research report (1999), "almost all of the
Science Park was down for several days, resulting in business interruption costs of about $50M
to $100M per day. Earthquake damage to distant 345 kV transmission towers and a switching
station made it impossible for the park to receive power from the usual steady supply from the
south of Taiwan. Power was slowly restored to major users in the area by rationing residential
and small commercial customers in other parts of the country, including Taipei. Some facilities
were able to maintain emergency power with the use of generators, although with varying
success. One wafer fabrication company sustained a large loss when the generators burned up
after running continuously for 40 hours after the earthquake. And with loss of the standby
power, this facility went completely black, and lost power to the fans that maintain the clean
room environment" (EQE, 1999). The Dell vs. Apple case discussed in Chapter 5 describes how
the two leading PC manufacturers were directly impacted by the disruption in the flow of critical
components from these Taiwanese suppliers and how they each responded, both with varying
levels of success.
It has been widely acknowledged in research reports - including both the RMS and EQE reports
referenced here - that the significant business interruption to the high-tech industry could have
been minimized with adequate seismic reinforcement of equipment and the proper execution of a
recovery plan that would have more specifically addressed an island-wide failure of the power
grid. In fact, the lack of redundancy in the power grid was a risk that had been identified well
before the '99 quake. Construction of a back-up line in Hsingchu had begun several years
earlier, but the project had been placed on hold until land acquisition problems could be resolved
(EQE, 1999). But as unprepared as they were, the magnitude of the disruption could have been
much, much worse. The only thing that saved the companies with plants located in Science
Park, and the computer technology supply chains that depended on them, from more profound
damage, was their distance from the epicenter. In that respect, the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake
should serve as a wake-up call not only for Hsingchu, but also for similar areas of concentrated
manufacturing and/or development capacity. For, as EQE (1999) attests, "the building and
equipment vulnerabilities at The Hsingchu Science Park are not much different from those in
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other high-tech parks like Silicon Valley in California, where the earthquake threat is as great
and is increasing over time" (EQE, 1999).
The port area of Taichung was also significantly affected, despite its distance from the epicenter
and major fault lines. For reference, the map shown in Figure 4.0 below illustrates the quake's
scope of damage with the major fault lines shown as dark lines that crisscross the island.
Liquefaction of the deep silty sand layers below the reclaimed land that Taichung was built on
was severe and resulted in many wide sink holes, some up to 20 m wide. While the rebuilding
efforts lasted over two years, the net disruption in Taiwan's shipping capability was not
significant. While the port's capacity was constrained during the period of recovery, shipments
were re-routed to other Taiwan ports that were not so severely damaged (EQE, 1999).
Figure 4.0 - 1999 Taiwan Earthquake
Epcntor
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Source: ABCNEWS.com/ Magellan Geographix
<www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/taiwan quake990921.html>
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Figure 5.0 - Kyoto University team crossing collapsed bridge northeast of Fengyuen
Source: Uhi-chi (Taiwan) tartlquake intormation
http://www2.rcep.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/-sato/taiwan/twpics/captions/twOO3.html
4.2.2 Kobe Earthquake - 01/17/95 - Kobe, Japan
At approximately 5:46 a.m. on January 1 7 th, 1995, as most of its citizens slept, western Japan
was rocked by the largest and most destructive earthquake to hit Japan since 1923. The "Hyogo-
ken Nanbu" earthquake, which registered 7.2 on the richter scale, made its epicenter only 20km
southwest of the port city of Kobe. The magnitude and proximity to such a densely populated
region resulted in massive property damage and significant loss of life. The devastation was the
worst in Kobe, where the quake toppled roadways, destroyed docks, severed communication,
and ruptured natural gas lines which kept the city in flames well into the next day. When the
dust settled, hardly a block in the industrial port city of 1.4 million people had a house or
building intact. Many streets were rendered impassable with scattered mounds of rubble
effectively blocking any all traffic. Over 5,250 people lost their lives while 30,000 were
wounded, causing a critical strain on area hospitals. The same effect could be seen at makeshift
shelters, which struggled to help the more than 400,000 citizens left homeless.
Kobe, Japan was the sixth largest port in the world and the gateway for 12% of Japan's exports.
As Richard Arnold (2001) notes, "no earthquake had struck any major Japanese urban center
with such destruction since the great Kanto earthquake of 1923 which killed 140,000 people in
Tokyo and Yokohama" (Arnold, 2001). Japan is one of the most geologically unstable places on
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Earth. The country has 40 active volcanoes that can produce up to 1,500 tremors in any given
year, most of them considered minor. To combat the effect of this constant threat, the risk of
earthquakes is considered heavily in architecture and civil defense planning. In fact, the majority
of buildings that collapsed as a result of the Kobe quake were those with wooden walls that
failed under the rocking of their heavy tile roofs. Most of the steel-framed buildings, built after
1981, were designed to bend without collapsing and suffered very little damage from the 20
seconds of severe shaking.
The worst effected area was in the Kobe's central region, a 5km by 20km area alongside the
main docks and port area. This area was built on soft and easily moved rocks. The port itself
was built on reclaimed ground similar to the port operations of the U.S.'s San Francisco bay.
Here, the ground literally liquefied and acted like thick soup. This allowed buildings to topple
sideways, resulting in many of the huge cranes in the harbor toppling over into the sea. All but 4
of the 239 shipping berths were damaged in the quake. To make matters worse, severe damage
to roadways and rail systems confounded rescue and cleanup efforts in the days and months
following the disaster. The worst damage was along the Hanshin Expressway, a major artery
between Osaka and Kobe, which collapsed in five places and killed twelve motorists. An
example of the damage can be seen in Figure 8.0 below. Other major roadways were damaged
in 20 places. The Shinkansen, Japan's famous high-speed "bullet" trains, were slowed to a crawl
when rails were damaged in 36 places. Local and commuter trains also sustained significant
damage. Airports, on the other hand, were only slightly delayed. Kansai International Airport,
built on Osaka Bay, was closed only temporarily on the day of the quake.
The massive failure of key infrastructure assets also played havoc on rescue and recovery efforts.
As in most cities, water, gas, electricity, and sewage services were provided via a network of
underground pipes and cables. When the ground began to shift, many of the rigid pipes could
not flex and quickly fractured. As a result, approximately three quarters of the city's water
supply compromised while natural gas lines leaked freely into the air and sewers discharged their
contents into the streets. Although much of the city's electricity was routed through above-
ground cables, they fared no better. Hundreds of Kobe's utility poles collapsed during the
earthquake, cutting off electricity to homes, businesses police and fire stations, and even
hospitals. As described at the Geography Resources for Teachers and Students Website (GRTS)
(2003), "the collapse of the electricity and telephone systems made it almost impossible for
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people to let the fire teams know where they were needed, whilst the broken water pipes and
blocked roads made it hard for fire teams to reach and put out fires" (GRTS, 2003).
The impact to Kobe's manufacturing base was also significant. Not immune from the complete
failure of much of the city's infrastructure, major electronics, steel, and heavy industry
manufacturing plants were forced to close for several days. As the Kobe Earthquake Summary
website (2003) attests, "many businesses were critically affected by severe employee
absenteeism and disruption of infrastructural services such as phone lines, electricity, gas and
water. Smaller firms also suffered heavy damage to building structures or contents. More than
40% of local knitted goods and over 90% of leather shoe manufacturing facilities were severely
affected. One week after the quake, 190 companies were unable to obtain water for industrial
consumption (Kobe Earthquake Summary website, 2003). The indirect effects of the disaster
were also significant. For those firms fortunate enough to quickly recover manufacturing
capacity, additional disruptions were the result of difficulty in obtaining direct materials and
other supplies. Major business disruptions included:
> Toyota Motor Corp. cut production by 20,000 cars because of problems finding supplies,
> Hanshin Electric Railway suffered $895M in damages to rail facilities, and
> Osaka Gas lost $170M to pipe repairs and an estimated $68M in lost revenues.
The massive damage to Kobe's port operations made a serious dent in the port's transport
capacity - a reported 2.7 million containers shipped each year. Manufactured goods from
Mitsubishi, Mazda, Toyota, and many other companies with facilities in the area had to be re-
routed via truck and rail to secondary ports throughout Japan. It took over two years to restore
Kobe's port operations to pre-earthquake capacity.
Recovery efforts lasted several years and required over $147B, making Kobe the most expensive
disaster in recorded history. And this figure does not even factor in the indirect economic impact
of the many business disruptions and lost manufacturing capacity. A summary of both the scope
of impact and the timeline for restoring Kobe's critical infrastructure are shown in Figures 6.0
and 7.0 below.
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Figure 6.0 - Kobe Earthquake Data
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Figure 7.0 - Kobe Recovery Statistics
Source: Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 2002
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/60379
Figure 8.0 - Large Section of Hanshin
Expressway Topples Over
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4.3 Severe Weather
Unlike earthquakes, severe weather occurs with no recognizably consistent pattern, at least not
over the long-term. This means that the severe weather hot spots are not as clearly delineated
from more tranquil areas. They can, however, be predicted with much greater short-term
accuracy which allows for at least some degree of warning. In the context of this thesis, severe
weather is a term that is meant to comprise destructive meteorological events like hurricanes,
tornados, and winter storms. Their strike area, frequency, and magnitude, are all functions of
rapidly changing weather variables that have yet to be completely understood. So while one
cannot quite so easily determine whether or not they are vulnerable to severe weather by where
they sit on a map, having a sound recovery strategy becomes all the more important. To
illustrate this point, Figure 38.0 in the Appendix summarizes the significant weather events that
occurred in the U.S. in 2001. Outside of the relative immunity of the western states to weather
disruptions, there are no readily discernible patterns in terms of the type of event, the magnitude,
or the frequency. It may be interesting to note that although the western states appear to have
suffered far fewer weather events in 2001 than the eastern or middle states, the opposite pattern
can be seen in U.S. seismic activity (Figure 39.0, Appendix). In terms of exposure, there is
simply no place to hide.
To better understand what the potential impact of such a disruption could be, Hurricane Andrew
(1992), Hurricane Mitch (1998), and the 1998 Quebec Ice Storm were studied in detail as a part
of this thesis and are profiled in the following pages. For additional damage statistics as a result
of severe weather events, please reference Figure 37.0 in the Appendix. It summarizes all U.S.
fatalities and damage costs due to severe weather in the United States from 1940 - 2001.
4.3.1 Hurricane Andrew - 08/16/92 - Southeastern USA, Bahamas, Bermuda
As described at the National Weather Service website (2003), Andrew started on August 14 th as
a tropical wave off the west coast of Africa. By August 1 6 th, convection became more focused in
a region of cyclonic cloud rotation and the wave transformed to a tropical depression. Between
August 17th and August 20 th, the system moved to about 925 km east-southeast of Bermuda. On
the morning of August 2 2 nd, Andrew reached hurricane. Andrew moved west for the next two
days and passed over the Bahamas on August 2 3 rd and 2 4 th. After leaving the Bahamas, Andrew
moved towards southeast Florida and made landfall near Homestead, Florida at 5:30 AM on
August 24th as a Category 4 hurricane with winds of 232 km/hr (125 knots) and gusts of 278
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km/hr (150 knots). Andrew crossed southern Florida in 4 hours. When it reached the Gulf of
Mexico, it turned to the west-northwest crossing south-central Louisiana coast as a Category 2
hurricane. Andrew weakened rapidly shortly after landfall. The remnants of Andrew continued
northward merging with another system over the mid-Atlantic U.S. states on August 28f
(National Weather Service, 2003).
Andrew caused enormous damage in the Bahamas and Florida. Significant storm surge was
created in both locations. In Florida, peak storm surge of 17 feet arrived when the tide was high.
Andrew also dropped significant amounts of rain on southeast Florida, Louisiana, and
Mississippi; Hammond, Louisiana reported 11.92 inches. 26 people died as a direct result of
Hurricane Andrew while indirect loss of life raised the death toll to 65. Fortunately, there was
ample warning, and good hurricane preparation and evacuation programs helped minimize this
number.
Hurricane Andrew destroyed 25,524 homes and damaged 101,241 others. In Homestead, Florida,
99% of all mobile homes were destroyed. Damage in the United States was estimated to be
roughly $25B, making Andrew the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history.
Figure 9.0 - Remains of a furniture warehouse west of Whispering Pines, FL
Source: National Weather Service
http://www.photolib.noaa.gov/historic/nws/Wea005 4 9 .htm
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4.3.2 Hurricane Mitch - 10/22/98 - South & Central America
According to the National Weather Service (2003), Hurricane Mitch originated from a tropical
wave that moved across southern Africa on October 8 th. The storm became Tropical Storm
Mitch on 10/22 while 415 km east-southeast of south of San Andreas Island. Mitch then
strengthened and moved north. Mitch reached its peak on October 2 6 th with estimated winds of
287 km per hour (155 knots) making it a Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale. On
October 2 7 th, Mitch then turned southwestward and passed near the island of Guanaja
(Honduras) as a Category 4 hurricane. From October 2 8th to October 30 th, Mitch stalled over
Honduras while gradually weakening. Mitch was a tropical storm by October 3 0 th and a tropical
depression by October 3 1st. The remnants of Mitch moved toward Merida, Mexico and became a
tropical storm again by November 3 rd. After making landfall over the northwestern Yucatan
peninsula, Mitch accelerated northeastward and made landfall near Naples, Florida with winds of
102 km/hr (55 knots). Mitch continued to move northeastward, moved offshore and became
extra-tropical. The overall motion of Hurricane Mitch was less then 7.5 km per hour (4 knots).
This resulted in very heavy rainfall estimated at up to 890 mms, primarily over Honduras and
Nicaragua. To put this into perspective, consider that this 3-4 day rainfall amount is comparable
to that for an 8-month period in Halifax, NS (National Weather Service, 2003).
The estimated death toll stands at 9,086. One of the deadliest hurricanes in history, most
fatalities occurred as a result of large-scale flooding especially in Honduras and Nicaragua. It
was also devastating from an economic perspective. It has been estimated that there was a 50%
loss to Honduras' agricultural crops (see Figure 10.0 below); and the UN estimated that 70% of
Honduras economic output was lost. At least 70,000 houses were damaged and over 92 bridges
were damaged or destroyed. Several communities became isolated as roads were damaged and
blocked (see Figure 11.0 on the following page). Total damage from the hurricane is estimated
to over $5B dollars. In Florida alone, the insured damage is estimated to cost $20M.
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Figure 10.0 - Hurricane Mitch Crop Damage, Honduras
Source: Michael Battistoni, Honduras.com
http://snrs.unl.edu/ainet35l/naiman/honduras.html
Figure 11.0 - Mitch Caused Massive Road Damage, Honduras
Source: Disaster Survey wetsite
http://long.linux-dude.net/cyrille/disaster/main.php?menu choice=6
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4.3.3 Quebec Ice Storm - 01/04/98 - Northern U.S. and Canada
According to CBS Newsworld (1999), scientists called the four consecutive days of freezing rain
an "unprecedented phenomenon". The rains began the night of January 5 th, 1997, during an
unusually mild winter. The abnormal conditions were the result of warm, moist air flowing from
the U.S. into Ontario and Quebec. As snow fell into the mass of warm air, it melted and fell as
rain only to later meet a mass of cold air at lower altitudes where it was transformed once again
to freezing rain. The result was the biggest ice storm to hit central Canada in 40 years. The
scope of the disruption, illustrated in Figure 12.0 below, stretched from Kingston in Ontario, to
Quebec City (CBS Newsworld, 1999). Over the next four days, three consecutive ice storms
raged non-stop and deposited up to 100 mm of ice in some areas, topping the previous record of
40mm. Freezing rain fell for four days without stop.
On Day 1, an initial layer of ice coated everything from trees to cars to power lines. This caused
1000 transmission towers and 30,000 wooden utility poles to be knocked down. By the end of
the day, more than 750,000 homes were completely without power. Hardest hit at first was the
region in and around Montreal. According to CBS Newsworld, in all, 120,000 km of
transmission and distribution lines, which took more than half a century to create, were brought
down within a week (CBS Newsworld, 1999). HydroQuebec, the area's major provider of
electricity, deployed crews from across the country to work at rebuilding the network. The task
required hundreds of hours of reconstruction at an estimated cost of roughly $500M. The extent
of the damage is described further in Figure 44.0, an appendix item that shows the status of
HydroQuebec's electric grid during peak storm conditions.
The storm would go on to incapacitate nearly 20% of the Canadian work force and leave
approximately 1.5 to 2M people in Canada and the US without electricity. Approximately
100,000 Canadians were forced to seek refuge during the disaster. Even a month after the power
loss, 700,000 people where still without electricity. In addition to the obvious effects of a
significant power outage, several not-so-obvious effects caused major problems. Without
electricity, farming equipment could not be operated and cattle could not be milked. When
milking cycles are interrupted for a significant period of time, a condition called mastitis, an
often-fatal infection of the udder, occurs. According to the Quebec Ice Storm website (2003),
this ultimately killed thousands of cows before power could be restored throughout Quebec.
Over 45 human fatalities were also directly attributed to the Quebec Ice Storm; from injuries
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ranging from hypothermia to carbon monoxide poisoning to chainsaw accidents. In total, the
economic losses of Montreal and Ottawa totaled approximately $700M, with insurance claims
totaling over $ 1B (Quebec Ice Storm Website, 2003).
Figure 12.0 - Area Affected by Quebec Ice Storm
Source: Disaster Survey Website
http://long.linux-dude.net/~cyrille/disaster/main.php?menu choice=13
Figure 13.0 - Tower Damage, Quebec Ice Storm




It is often said that water is the most destructive force on earth. Most flood survivors would
probably agree. Major floods, such as the 1993 Mississippi River Flood and the Summer 2002
floods that submerged much of Central Europe, transformed landscapes, destroyed public and
private property, brought local commerce to a grinding halt, and claimed countless lives. In each
case, the waterways that had formed the basis for much of the regions' economic development
and prosperity over the years proved to be a double-edged sword when heavy rains swelled the
rivers to overflow conditions. For area residents and businesses, the results were horrific. For
area residents and businesses without insurance - 85% of the 2002 Euro flood losses were
uninsured - or a resilience strategy, the results were catastrophic. Three cases - the '93
Mississippi River Flood, the 2002 European Floods, and a 2001 building flood - are outlined
below to provide accounts of how devastating these events can be.
4.4.1 1993 Mississippi River Flood - Summer 1993 - Midwestern U.S.
The Mississippi River begins at Lake Itasca in Minnesota and stretches over 2,000 miles south to
the Gulf of Mexico. While the residents along its banks are certainly not strangers to periodic
flooding, none of them were ready for what the river had in store during the summer of 1993.
From late June to mid-August that year, the most devastating flood in U.S. history washed over
the upper and middle Mississippi Valley. At its peak, 17,000 square miles of land were covered
by floodwaters in an area that included all or part of nine states (see Fig. 14.0 below).
Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri were the hardest hit. At St. Louis, for example, the river
crested at 49.6 ft. - more than 19 ft. above flood stage and more than 6 ft. above the previous
record set in 1973 - and remained over flood stage for two months. Homes were destroyed,
farmland was ruined, and businesses were disrupted if not completely wiped out.
The chain of events that caused the deadly flooding that summer was set in motion as early as
the Fall of 1992. That year, cooler than normal conditions prevailed, and resulted in lower than
normal evaporation activity after fall and winter storms. Eventually, the soil became saturated,
so spring precipitation and snowmelt, normally able to soak into the ground, could only run off
into nearby streams and rivers. As individual storms continued to dump large volumes of
precipitation on the area that Spring, local streams quickly reached capacity. By June 1s' of
1993, the Mississippi and its tributaries were already running higher than average. At that point,
a persistent southward displacement of the jet stream began to develop and the situation began to
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worsen when a series of severe thunderstorms stalled over the Midwest. As the University of
Akron's David McConnell (1998) explains, "The abnormal rainfall was attributed to a weather
system formed when warm moist air from the Gulf of Mexico collided with cold, dry air from
Canada over the Midwest. When the warm Gulf air cooled, it lost it lost the moisture it carried
as rain. Normally, this rainfall would have been distributed throughout the northeastern states,
but a stalled high-pressure system over the southeast blocked the flow of the jet stream bringing
a constant stream of storms over the Midwest" (McConnell, 1998). This stationary system
dominated weather patterns in the U.S. for much of June and July, bringing wave after wave of
drenching thunderstorms to the already saturated Mississippi River basin. According to
Weather.com Storm Encyclopedia (2003), by the end of the summer, many locations had
received over 30 inches of rain which was nearly 200% over normal (Weather.com, 2003).
The persistent flood conditions that summer brought widespread destruction and misery to the
Mississippi Valley. The greatest economic losses occurred in cities on the floodplain. To
illustrate the extent of the flooding, Figures 15.0 and 16.0 below show satellite images of St.
Louis, Missouri, under both pre and post-flood conditions. According to Weather.com (2003),
the 250,000 residents of Des Moines, Iowa, located in the center of the flood region, were
without drinking water for nineteen days when the city's waster treatment plant flooded. Before
the municipal water supply could be restored, the water pipes, contaminated by floodwaters
carrying sewage and agricultural chemicals, had to be thoroughly flushed out. Economic losses
in Des Moines alone totaled over $716M (McConnell, 1998). In all, over 70,000 people were
displaced by the floods. Roughly 50,000 homes were damaged or destroyed and 52 people lost
their lives (Weather.com, 2003).
The flooding also wreaked havoc on the local economies. According to McConnell (1998), over
eight million acres of farmland was submerged rendered useless. As a result, production of corn
and soybeans were down 5-9% and corn prices rose by $0.15 per bushel. The river's role as a
major transportation lane was also severely compromised. Barge traffic, which normally moves
through a system of 29 locks between Minneapolis and St. Louis, transports 20% of the nation's
coal, 33% of its petroleum, and half of its exported grain. Barges were halted for two months
during the flooding, costing carriers an estimated $iM per day. Some power plants along the
river saw their coal stocks shrink from a two-month supply to just 20 days worth. Land
transportation was also affected. Hundreds of miles of roadways that ran through the floodplains
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were damaged with repair costs were estimated to have reached $500M (McConnell, 1998).
Before the waters began to recede that August, the floods had covered an area covering 500
miles long and 200 miles wide. 534 counties in nine states were declared federal disaster sites.
According to Ramsey (2002), total economic losses reached $10-15B, although indirect losses in
the form of lost wages and production are difficult to accurately calculate and would likely raise
loss estimates significantly (Ramsey, 2002). By all measures, the 1993 Mississippi River Flood
was the most destructive in recorded U.S. history.
Figure 14.0 - 1993 Mississippi River Flood Region
Source: McConnell, 1998
Figure 15.0 - Pre-Flood St. Louis, MO Figure 16.0 - Post-Flood St. Louis, MO
Source: NASA (http://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov)
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4.4.2 Central European Floods - Summer 2002 - Germany, Czech Republic, Austria
The flood conditions that affected that washed over large portions of Central Europe over the
Summer of 2002 were triggered by unusual, but not extraordinary, meteorological conditions.
As an EQE Technical Report (2003) explains, two rain-bearing depressions crossed Europe in
close succession during the first half of August. The first high-altitude, low-pressure system
formed in the Atlantic and crossed Northern England and Scotland on July 31st, causing minor
flooding in northern England. By the 6 th and 8 th of August, the system had reached southern
Germany and Austria, where torrential rainfall resulted. The system then moved eastwards along
the southern side of the Alps, resulting in further heavy rainfall in Romania, The Czech
Republic, and the eastern coast of the Black Sea. This first depression was quickly followed by
"Ilse", a second rain-bearing storm, which moved southeast from England, causing heavy rain in
northern Italy, before shifting direction northeast and causing further rains in Austria, The Czech
Republic, and southern Germany (EQE, 2003). The heaviest precipitation centered over Austria
and The Czech Republic, and produced cumulative rainfall in excess of three times the seasonal
average, triggering sequential flood waves along the region's two major river systems. The
flood waves moved down the Danube through Austria and down the Vltava, Labe, and Elbe
rivers into The Czech Republic and Germany. The geographic reach of the flood is illustrated in
Figure 17.0 below.
The first flood wave hit the area over the weekend of August 10 th, triggering flash floods and
landslides across northern Italy, southern Germany, Austria, Romania, and the Baltic Sea coast
of Russia. By the following Monday, August 12th, the river Danube in Austria overflowed its
banks at several points, damaging or destroying an estimated 10,000 houses. Across the border
in The Czech Republic, the intense rainfall entered the headwaters of the river Vltava, causing
similar overflow. As the flood waters approached the capital city of Prague, roughly 50,000
residents were evacuated, all bridges over the Vltava were closed to traffic, and 9ft.-high flood
barriers were erected along the banks to protect the city center (RMS, 2003). As the flood wave
continued downstream towards Germany, many small town and villages in its path were severely
damaged. Across The Czech Republic, seventeen people were killed and an estimated 220,000
evacuated. In Dresden, about 200 km (124 mi.) from Prague, flooding submerged the main
railway station and numerous parts of the historic city center. Fortunately, early warnings
allowed many paintings and other priceless works of art to be removed from the lower levels of
the damaged buildings. More catastrophic flooding occurred further downstream around the
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towns of Dessau and Bitterfeld. Across the effected regions of Germany, 180 bridges were
damaged along with 740 km (460 mi.) of roadways and 538 km (334 mi.) of railway track (RMS,
2003).
Besides the human toll, the floods also did something almost unheard of according to Green &
Pohl (2002) in a 2002 New York Times article - they stopped production of The Czech
Republic's two most famous beers, Pilsner and the original Budweiser. Production at both
breweries was halted for over a week because of the flooding (Green & Pohl, 2002). The
Prague Stock Exchange was also closed for two days while rising water levels threatened the
trading floor and prevented access to the building. The Prague subway was especially hard-hit.
According to The Guardian (2002), damage was estimated at two billions crowns ($64M) with
seventeen stations closed due to the flooding. The Unipetrol plant in Spolana, Czech Republic,
20 km from the capital city of Prague, issued a third degree chemical alert (just one level short of
evacuation) when a leak of toxic chlorine gas was caused by the rushing waters (The Guardian,
2002). Fortunately, the leak proved to have negligible environmental effect and no direct impact
on the region's citizens. And perhaps the most unexpected fatality occurred when, as reported
by CNN.com (2002), a civilian was killed by shrapnel when Czech forces blew up runaway
barges that threatened to slam into bridges (Hanna, 2002).
Throughout Central Europe, unprecedented flood heights were reached along the major river
systems and over 110 people lost their lives before the waters receded. By December 2002, total
economic damage estimates exceeded E I5B, of which only about 15% was insured according to
RMS (2003). Germany was the hardest hit, with over two thirds of the total losses. After
Germany, The Czech Republic suffered the next largest loss at E3B, of which over one third was
attributed to Prague alone.
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Figure 17.0 - Major Rivers and Cities Affected by 2002 Central European Floods 
o 45 00 1190 
Source: RMS, 2003 
Figure 18.0 - Flood Damage in Prague, 2002 
Source:RMS, 2003 
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4.4.3 Seven Building Flood. - 01/06/02 - London, England
Seven Worldwide, one of Europe's largest digital asset management companies, experienced a
significant business disruption that stemmed from a very unlikely source. As Bernard (2003)
describes in a 2003 case study, the company's headquarters, a 5-floor 45,000 sq. ft. building in
the City of London, leased its top floor to a leading international disaster recovery supplier,
which used the space to house a hot back-up site. To protect its expensive, mission-critical
information technology (IT) hardware assets from fire, the firm had installed a powerful
sprinkler system. Ironically, the system would prove to have just the opposite effect (Bernard,
2003).
In the early morning hours of Sunday, January 6 th 2002, a 5th-floor water supply pipe failed
which activated a water pump that ran uninterrupted for several hours, effectively flooding the
building by 4 a.m. Before the problem was discovered, water had cascaded through all five of
the building's floors, including computer server rooms, reprographics and artwork suites,
proofing and printing equipment, and several general computing suites. Sub-floor IT and
electrical systems flooded and elevator shafts became partially submerged. Because the failure
occurred after-hours and on the weekend, there was nobody on-site to detect and resolve it.
Seven staff discovered became aware of the problem on Sunday afternoon and immediately
initiated the disaster recovery plan that the firm had designed with the help of a 3 rd-party
business continuity firm, London-based Restorex. Despite a total loss of power and services, and
with the help of Restorex, the company was able to service its clients without interruption and
resumed most production services within 24 hours of the flood. And because they responded
quickly and prudently, almost all of their E2.5M in state of the art data management equipment
was salvaged. Seven's investment in a sound disaster recovery plan with a reliable partner
prepared them to fail smartly, thus minimizing the impact of the disruption. This example shows
that potential supply chain disasters are lurking everywhere. Sharing your headquarters with a
disaster recovery service provider does not necessarily mean your operations are any less
vulnerable. A sound business continuity or disaster recovery plan can however, do much to
mitigate the risks regardless of the root cause of the disruption.
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4.5 Fires
While not often as destructive, in terms duration and magnitude, as natural disasters like floods
or earthquakes, fires can be just as devastating for the residents or businesses that are directly
affected. An unexpected blaze can quickly devour a manufacturing plant, a warehouse, or even a
truckload of in-transit inventory. And for many high-technology industries the employ sensitive,
calibrated manufacturing equipment, even the smoke from a fire can cause significant damage
and bring down a production line for days, if not weeks. Three cases - a 2000 Philips Plant fire,
a 1999 blaze at a plastics manufacturer, and a 1997 fire at a key Toyota supplier - are outlined
below to provide accounts of how devastating these events can be, especially for the unprepared
and overexposed.
4.5.1 Philips Plant Fire - 03/17/00 - Albuquerque, NM
At approximately 8 p.m. on March 17, 2000, a bolt of lightning struck an electric power line in
New Mexico, setting off a chain reaction that would eventually pit two of the world's largest
mobile communications companies against each other in a test of supply chain resiliency. The
strike caused major fluctuations across the state's grid power grid, which led to a fire in
Fabricator No. 22 at an Albuquerque semiconductor plant owned and operated by Philips
Electronics NV. The blaze lasted only ten minutes before workers smothered the flames, but that
was enough time to ruin eight trays of silicon wafers - enough to produce chips for thousands of
mobile telephone handsets - and cause significant damage to the plants high-precision
fabrication equipment. Between the smoke from the fire and the activation of the sprinkler
system, the ten minute blaze rendered the plant completely unable to produce the computer chips
that companies like Nokia and Ericsson depended upon for the production of mobile telephone
handsets. It would take Philips weeks to bring the Albuquerque plant back online, time that
neither Nokia nor Ericsson could afford to wait given the recent boom in global mobile-phone
sales. While both companies were affected in very much the same way, they could not have
reacted more differently to the sudden disruption in the flow of these most critical components.
Nokia managers outside of Helsinki detected a problem in the flow of chips even before Philips
contacted them with the news of the fire in Albuquerque. When order numbers began failing to
add up, the company's chief component purchasing manager immediately contacted their Philips
account representative to investigate. After discovering the nature of the disruption, the
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purchasing manager quickly sent word of the situation through the chain of command to the
highest levels of management. As reported by the Wall Street Journal (2001), according to Pertii
Korhonen, Nokia's chief supply troubleshooter, they "encourage bad news to travel fast. [They]
don't want to hide problems" (Latour, 2001). Within days, a crisis management team was
assembled and deployed across Europe, Asia, and the U.S. to develop a solution to the supply
problem. The team "redesigned chips on the fly, sped up a project to boost production, and
flexed the company's muscle to squeeze more out of other suppliers in a hurry" (Latour, 2001).
They were determined to secure enough alternate sources of radio frequency chips to prevent any
impact to overall production. In the meantime, Nokia checked in with Philips daily to check the
status of recovery process and applied constant pressure, up to the CEO level, to ensure that they
were allocated any capacity that Philips could provide from their other fabrication plants.
Because of Nokia's size, tenacity, and almost immediate response to the situation, they were
quite successful in pushing Philips to reroute capacity. More than ten million chips were
replaced by a Philips plant in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, and another plan in Shanghai was
freed up for Nokia as well.
Ericsson, on the other hand, did not fare quite so well. First of all, they were not as prepared for
the problem as Nokia was. Philips was their sole supplier for radio frequency chips (RFCs).
There were no other alternate suppliers to turn to for failover capacity. Ericsson was also much
slower to detect the problem than their Finnish competitors. News of the fire was first
communicated by an informal conversation between two technicians. When official word finally
came from Philips as to how serious the problem really was, still more time passed before middle
managers notified their bosses. In fact, the head of the mobile phone division did not find out
about the fire until several weeks after it occurred. Without alternate suppliers to turn to,
Ericsson was left with only one option - try to pressure Philips to reroute capacity from other
plants until the Albuquerque plant was back online. As they soon found out, Nokia has beaten
them to the punch and had claimed all of the capacity that Philips had to give. Ericsson was left
with severe component shortages, the wrong product mix, and myriad marketing problems - all
at a time when reported demand was as record levels.
When the smoke finally cleared and the full impact of the Albuquerque fire was known for both
companies, the results clearly reflected the companies' contrasting approaches. Nokia was able
to meet its production targets despite the fire and maintained aggressive growth projections for
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handset sales the following year. Ericsson, however, reported that the fire contributed to a 2000
loss of $1.68B, sending shares down 14% over a period of just a few hours. While the
experience drove them to overhaul procurement practices, ensuring that key components come
from more than one source, the lesson came too late to save their mobile handset business. After
losing significant market share, mostly to Nokia, in the weeks following the fire, Ericsson
eventually chose to leave the market altogether and now outsources all handset manufacturing to
Flextronics International Ltd. Commenting on the procurement changes that Ericsson introduced
soon after the fire, Jan Wareby, the head of the mobile-phone division, stated that "[they] will
never be exposed like this again" (Latour, 2001). Unfortunately for Ericsson, there wouldn't be
an "'again", at least not for the mobile handset division.
4.5.2 Avon Injected Rubber & Plastics Plant Fire - 04/02/99 - Albion, NY
Avon Rubber and Injected Plastics (Avon) is the automotive division of Avon Rubber, a
manufacturer of diversified rubber products founded in Wiltshire, England in 1885. The division
occupies a single 200,000 ft2 production facility located in Albion, NY and supplies rubber
gaskets, door seals, and other rubber products to most leading automotive OEMs including
General Motors, Ford, and Daimler-Chrysler. Over the past several years, Avon had come to
enjoy the position of sole supplier of various types of rubber gaskets to several of these leading
OEMs. As in many industries, it was thought that consolidating the supply base would provide
cost savings through economies of scale and lower procurement overhead. It is also likely that
rubber gaskets were not considered a key component and therefore presented little risk of
disrupting operations should a supply problem develop. On a Friday afternoon in April, 1999,
the OEMs would learn otherwise.
The fire was reported shortly after 2pm on Friday, April 2, 1999. Ten fire departments
responded to fight the 3-alarm blaze, but could not prevent the complete destruction of Avon's
40,000 ft2 production floor, rendering the Albion plant completely unable to produce. According
to Dean Depew, the Albion plan manager, "several automotive plants were dependent on Avon's
products in order to continue their own production and a shutdown of those plants would result
in at least $10,000,000 a day in losses" (MJ Mechanical, 2001). At the time of the fire, Avon
had ten days worth of product in stock before the losses would begin piling up. Once notified,
many of Avon's customers turned to alternate suppliers to protect against a likely shortage of
rubber gaskets. At least one of the OEMs that sole-sourced from Avon was not so fortunate.
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When they turned to other suppliers, they found that none could form gaskets with exactly the
same properties. It turned out that Avon used unique steam-driven production equipment, which
could not be found anywhere other than the Albion plant. After quickly running out of options,
the auto maker was forced to partially subsidize the complete restoration of Avon's
manufacturing capabilities if they hoped to restore supply before Avon's ten days of finished
goods inventories, in addition to whatever inventory the auto maker may have been holding on-
site, was consumed. Fortunately for all, the Albion plant was brought back online without the
OEM having to completely halt production, although not without incurring significant cost at the
expense of both Avon and one of its largest customers.
Important lessons can be taken from the Avon case; from both the supplier and the OEM
perspective. Avon learned that complete centralization of manufacturing resources can be
disastrous, regardless of the operating efficiencies that it may provide. The large auto maker that
had to finance part of its supplier's recovery learned that sole sourcing can be dangerous,
regardless of how important, or not, that component may seem to the finished product. In this
case, a rubber gasket came very close to halting production. In addition to arranging for multiple
suppliers in different locations, it is also important to understand the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of those suppliers to determine what their exposure to supply risk. The OEM
could have transitioned to an alternate supplier had it not found that their gaskets, as specified,
demonstrated characteristics that limited production only to Avon's unique steam-driven
machinery.. .which existed only in the Albion plant. This fact dramatically increased their
exposure to risk and taught them a painful lesson in effective sourcing strategy.
4.5.3 Toyota P-Valve Supplier Plant Fire - 02/01/97 - Kariya, Japan
Just after 4 a.m. on Saturday February 1, 1997, sparks from a broken drill ignited several wooden
platforms at the Aisin Seiki Co. Factory No. 1 in Kariya, Japan. The fire spread quickly, was
swept through an air duct, and ignited the roof. The building was soon completely engulfed in
flames. And to compound the tragedy, Aisin's Kariya factory was the sole-source of brake fluid
proportioning valves - or "P-valves", which pressure on rear brakes and help prevent skidding -
for Toyota's 20 automobile plants in Japan. At the time, Toyota's Japanese plants were
producing roughly 14,000 cars per day and were operating under a Just-In-Time operating
strategy that permitted only about four hours worth of inventory to be held at any given time.
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When the blaze was finally extinguished, virtually all of the plant's 506 highly specialized
machines, which made other brake parts in addition to P-valves, were rendered charred and
useless. As noted above, under Toyota's JIT inventory strategy, most plants kept only a four-
hour supply of the $5 valve on-hand. Without the part, Toyota had no choice but to shut down
all 20 of its auto plants in Japan. It was estimated that more than two weeks would be needed
just to restore a few milling machines to partial production and six month to order new machines.
In a period of strong domestic demand and an increasingly brisk-selling U.S. market, this was
not acceptable. Outside of the significant financial loss for Toyota, the effects would be
disastrous for the local and national economies as well. As quoted in a 1997 Wall Street Journal
article by Philip Reitman, one state agency estimated that each day Toyota is shut down cuts
Japan's annual industrial output by 0.1 percentage points (Reitman, 1997).
For most parts, Toyota had at least two suppliers. But over the years, it had turned to Aisin to
produce all but 1% of its P-valves because of their high quality and low cost. Aisin shipped
parts to Toyota plants several times a day, replenishing just enough valves for a few hours of
production. Toyota managers conceded that depending on a single source and holding
essentially zero inventory was risky however, it is also what kept Toyota's production costs low.
Aisin achieved significant economies of scale that it passed on to Toyota in the form of lower
prices, while JIT effectively minimized inventory carrying costs. Toyota also acknowledged that
it didn't figure in the risk of fire. Regardless, the situation was what it was and the focus of
Toyota and its supply base was now directed solely on recovering production capability as soon
as humanly possible.
Even as the fire burned, Aisin officials organized a committee to assess the situation, notify
customers and labor unions and, following Japanese custom, visit neighbors to apologize. A
sub-committee ordered 320 cell phones, 230 extra phone lines, and several dozen sleeping bags
for executives who were expected to live at headquarters in the days following the fire. At 8
a.m., Aisin asked Toyota for help. A senior Toyota managing director was tracked down at a
golf-course clubhouse, where he left his wife and rushed to Toyota headquarters to help establish
a war room to direct the damage-control operations. They immediately sent 400 engineers to
Aisin. Later that afternoon, a second war room was set up at Aisin headquarters where Toyota
summoned officials from several of its other major parts suppliers to discuss plans to resume the
flow of the valves. With over 200 P-valve variations required for the range of Toyota models
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that Aisin supplied, the task was daunting. And chances that anyone else would quickly take up
production were slim to nil. The valves have many complex tapered orifices that require highly
customized jigs and drills. Everyone involved quickly realized that the best chance for a timely
recovery lied in allocating production across the supply base. After receiving their respective
valve-making assignments from Toyota executives, each supplier quickly set off to mobilize
their respective teams in pursuit of a solution. For example, Somic Ishikawa Inc., a supplier of
brake parts and suspension ball joints, called an emergency planning meeting with its top
production engineers on Sunday night to map out a strategy. At 6 a.m. Monday, the company
began an around-the-clock effort to make the jigs that it would need. On Wednesday, February
6 th, they delivered their first P-valves to Toyota, as promised. Similar work efforts were also
exerted by the other suppliers, each wanting to be the first to deliver its allocation of valves to
Toyota. In fact, so many suppliers were rushing to please Toyota that an unofficial race ensued.
Toyota received trucks bearing the first 1,000 usable P-valves by late Wednesday. The
following day brought 3,000 units with 5,000 arriving Friday. Slowly, Toyota's assembly lines
began to spark back to life. When all was said and done, Toyota lost production of 72,000
vehicles however, with overtime and extra shifts, it claimed to have almost completely recouped
the lost output over the months following the shutdown. The Aisin fire prompted Toyota to
make several changes, however, allocating the supply of P-valves across more than one source
was not one of them. Management remained convinced that they had the right balance of
efficiency and risk. After tempering the benefits of multiple supply sources with the costs of
setting up expensive milling machines at each site, they stayed true to their pre-fire operating
strategy. The experience did drive Toyota to begin reducing the number of its parts variations, a
problem that had made the P-valve recovery all the more challenging. It also motivated other
sole-suppliers to invest in fail-safe mechanisms. For example, Somic Ishikawa revamped its
system to allow them to quickly shift production to a secondary site if it had to.
Most experts predicted that the recovery would take many weeks. Toyota was back up after only
5 days. The secret of Toyota's miraculous recovery lay primarily in its close-knit family, or
"keiretsu", of parts suppliers. Within hours of the disaster, they had begun taking blueprints for
the valve, improvising tool systems, and setting up makeshift production lines. By the following
Thursday, the 36 suppliers, aided by more than 150 other subcontractors, had nearly 50 separate
lines producing small batches of the brake valve. In one case, a sewing-machine maker that had
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never made car parts spend about 500 man-hours refitting a milling machine to make just 40
valves a day. As quoted by Reitman (1997) in the Wall Street Journal, "toyota's quick
recovery", said Yoshio Yunokawa, general manager of a Toyota-group maker of machine tools
and steering systems, "[was] directly attributable to the power of the group, which handled it
without thinking about money or business contracts" (Reitman, 1997). Indeed, suppliers never
asked Toyota or Aisin how they would be compensated for rushing out the valves. Says Somic's
Mr. Ishikawa, "we trusted them" (Reitman, 1997). That trust was validated when Aisin, as the
first valves arrived at Toyota assembly plants, told suppliers that it would reimburse them for all
costs incurred; from drills and overtime pay to lost revenue and depreciation. In similar fashion,
Toyota promised suppliers bonuses totaling roughly $1 GOM "as a token of their appreciation." It
is little wonder that Toyota Motor Corp. remains among the world's most admired and feared
manufacturing companies in the history of business.
4.6 Port Explosions/Disruptions
In a 2002 InformationWeek.com article, Eileen Cuneo estimates that over 90% of world trade
travels in containers aboard ocean-going ships. About 20 million containers move through 220
ports around the globe every year. Six million enter U.S. ports each year alone. That works out
to 17,000 every day (Cuneo, 2002). Considering those statistics, it is not difficult for one to
understand how devastating a major port disruption could be to the flow of global commerce.
With these volumes, it is also not difficult to understand just how daunting a task port security
can be. It is simply not practical, let alone feasible, to screen every container that enters a U.S.
port on any given day. As industry and governments begin moving towards a solution that
maximizes security without compromising the flow of goods, several federal and commercial
initiatives have been introduced, including Smart and Safe Tradelanes (SST) and the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). At this point, it is too early to tell how
successful these initiatives will be, but early both SST and C-TPAT appear to be gaining
significant traction among port operators, shipping companies, importer, and exporters.
Fortunately, there have been no major port disasters in the last fifty years to learn from, however,
two early cases, the 1917 Halifax Port Explosion and the 1947 Texas City Disaster, are outlined
below to provide accounts of how devastating a large explosion at a major shipping port can be.
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4.6.1 Halifax Port Explosion - 12/06/17 - Nova Scotia, Canada
During the First World War, the port of Halifax, Nova Scotia was a strategic supply point used
for shipping soldiers and military cargo across the Atlantic. At approximately 7:30 a.m. on
December 6, 1917, a French munitions ship, the Mont Blanc, was headed north into the Halifax
Harbor, where it was to wait for the rest of its convoy before setting off for Europe to supply the
French military. The 3,000 ton ship was loaded with 200 tons of TNT, 2,300 tons of pitric acid,
61 tons of gun cotton, and 35 tons of highly flammable Benzyl. At the same time, a Belgian
ship, the Imo, was headed southward through the Harbor's channel headed out to the open sea
and bound for New York to pick up relief supplies for Belgium.
The ships were supposed to pass each other in the Narrows (see Figure 19.0 below) "port-to-
port", with each captain staying to his right, as the left sides of the ships went by each other. The
Mont Blanc observed the much-larger Imo bearing down fast and too far east, threatening to
force the Mont Blanc precariously close to the shore on the right. Because the Mont Blanc failed
to fly the requisite red flag indicating that it was explosives, the captain of the Imo could not
have known the potential danger of the situation. The Mont Blanc signaled that it was in the
correct channel however, the Imo signaled back that it intended to bear even farther into the
Mont Blanc's path. The captain of the Mont Blanc then signaled that it would pass on the
starboard side, not "port-to-port" as protocol usually requires. The Mont Blanc then expected
the Imo to towards Halifax to let it pass, but the Imo failed to change its course. Desperate to
avoid a collision, the captain of the Mont Blanc decided to swing drastically left toward Halifax.
Unfortunately, it was too late. When both ships realized that a collision could not be avoided,
they reversed their engines and braced for impact.
The Imo struck the Mont Blanc, sending sparks flying from the steel-on-steel impact. Although
the impact was not severe, the Mont Blanc's highly flammable cargo immediately erupted in
flames. The crew of the Mont Blanc, aware of its cargo and realizing the disaster that was
unfolding, dove into the frigid waters and swam for their lives. The Imo pulled away in an
attempt to disentangle itself from the burning ship, but was unaware of the true scope of the
situation. The Mont Blanc crew that made it to shore tried to warn people of the danger lurking
just off shore, but the citizens could not understand the French sailors and instead gathered on at
the harbor to watch the fire.
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1The Mont Blanc burned for approximately twenty minutes and drifted towards Pier 6 at the
North end of the harbor, drawing the growing crowd of curious onlookers even closer. Just
before 9:05 a.m., the Mont Blanc erupted in what was the largest man-made explosion until the
atomic age. In fact, its effects were studied by Oppenheimer during the Manhattan Project to
calculate the strength of the bombs destined for Hiroshima. The blast immediately created a
colossal tidal wave that hurled itself onto the shores of the harbor destroying everything in its
path. For an instant, the bottom of the harbor was visible. The explosion also sent the Mont
Blanc's 1,140 lb. anchor shaft over 2 miles and shattered windows 50 miles away. 1,600 people
were killed instantly and 9,000 others were wounded. Flying glass claimed the eyesight of 200
people that were watching from windows. The explosion, and the fires that followed it,
devastated the entire north end of Halifax (325 acres) and completely destroyed 1,630 homes.
Initially, the captain of the Mont Blanc thought to have not obeyed the rules of the harbor, was
charged with manslaughter and released on bail. The charges were eventually dropped as gross
negligence causing death could not be proved. After a series of court hearings, both ships were
found equally at fault and no blame was ever truly laid for the devastating Halifax port
explosion.
Figure 19.0 - Halifax Explosion Blast Radius (S.S. Imo in Inset)
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Source: Maritime Museum of the Atlantic
<http://museum.gov.ns.ca/mma/AtoZ/HaIExpl.html>
4.6.2 Texas City Disaster - 04/16/47 - Texas City, TX
On the morning of April 16, 1947, the S.S. Grandcamp, a French cargo ship, was docked in the
Texas City harbor awaiting the remaining pallets of a large consignment of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer destined for Europe. Over 2,300 tons of the material was already onboard, 800 tons of
which was loaded in the lower part of Hold 4. The ship also held drilling equipment, tobacco,
cotton, large balls of sisal twine, and several cases of small arms ammunition.
Just before 8:00am, several longshoremen descended into Hold 4 to begin loading the remaining
pallets of 100-lb. fertilizer bags. Before the first pallet could be loaded however, a fire was
discovered smoldering deep within the stacks of loaded cargo. Equipped with only a jug of
drinking water and two small fire extinguishers, the crew's initial attempts to quell the blaze
were futile. While the crewmembers in Hold 4 summoned for a hose, others began hastily
unloading the boxes of ammunition stored in Hold 5 to prevent an explosion. The hose soon
arrived and was lowered into Hold 4, but before it could be turned on, the Captain of the ship
interfered. He was afraid that the water from the hose would ruin the ship's precious cargo and
ordered the men to suffocate the flames instead. So they battened the hatches and covered them
with wet tarpaulins, closed the ventilators, and activated the ship's steam system. The fire
continued however, and soon the entire Texas City Fire Department was dispatched to help
contain what had quickly become a raging inferno. Large crowds, drawn by both the bright
orange smoke and the spectacle of the firefighting effort, began to gather at the scene. Crowds
even took to the skies, as two airplanes loaded with spectators circled the port from above. The
crowds did not realize however, that the cargo hold of the burning ship contained over 2,400 tons
of highly explosive ammonium nitrate. While most of the crew and perhaps some of the
firefighters knew what was on the ship, it seems that nobody at the scene knew how dangerous
the cargo really was. Recall that the explosive device used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing
was fueled by just three tons of ammonium nitrate, 1/800th the load of the Grandcamp. An
executive at Texas City Terminal Railway even telephoned an engineer at a nearby chemical
plant to ascertain the danger of burning ammonium nitrate. The engineer advised the executive
not to worry as the material would not explode without a detonator.
Just before 9:00am, the ammonium nitrate in Hold 4 of the Grandcamp exploded, causing a
hellish chain reaction that decimated the port of Texas City and much of the city itself. The blast
lifted the 176-ton ship 20 feet in the air and ignited the larger cache of fertilizer in Hold 2,
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triggering another violent explosion. Most of those gathered at the scene were killed instantly,
even those in the sky. The shockwave from the second blast felled both of the airplanes that
were circling above. Flaming debris rained down on Texas City, creating a chain reaction of
fires that soon engulfed a nearby industrial park, the Monsanto Chemical Plant, and scores of
other residential and commercial structures. The explosion also created a 15-ft tidal wave that
wiped out everything in its path as it pushed oil and debris, including a 150-ft barge, over the
banks of the harbor. As the town struggled to assess the damage and tend to the injured, yet
another disaster was in the making. The SS High Flyer, docked in the Texas City harbor for
engine repairs, was knocked from its moorings and ignited by the Grandcamp explosion. It was
also loaded with ammonium nitrate. The fire was discovered in the late afternoon and reported
to rescue workers, but several hours passed before the danger of the situation was fully realized
and a tugboat team was assembled to remove the smoldering ship from the harbor.
Unfortunately, it was too late. After two hours of futile effort, including severing the ship's
anchor lines, the team was unable to move the vessel and was forced to retreat as flames began to
rise from the cargo hold. Ten minutes later, the High Flyer exploded with a force reported to be
even greater than that of the Grandcamp. This triggered a second chain reaction of fires and
explosions that claimed many of the buildings, crude oil tanks, and various other structures that
had been somehow spared during the previous day's destruction.
When the smoke cleared, the Texas City Disaster had claimed over 500 lives and caused over
$100 (1947 dollars) million in reported property loss, not including the $500 million in
petroleum products consumed in the blaze. 2,000 Texas City residents were rendered homeless
after one third of all residential homes were condemned. The town would take many years to
recover. In terms of commercial operations, Stephens (1997), reported that "even though the
port's break-bulk cargo-handling operations never resumed, Monsanto was rebuilt in little more
than a year, and the petrochemical industry recovered quickly" (Stephens, 1997)
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Figure 20.0 - Map of Galveston Bay and Texas City Harbor
} ROUSIDA AND
GALVETON MY V'CfNJTY
Source: The Texas City Disaster, 1947
http://205.172.60. 10/comnm/virtual/readingroom/books/blast.htm




The world entered a new age of global terror when the twin towers of New York City's World
Trade Center were felled in a terrorist attack of unprecedented ferocity and magnitude. While
terrorism certainly moved to the forefront of world consciousness that morning, many would
argue that the threat has been present for many years. According to a 2001 U.S. Department of
State report, from 1996 to 2001, 2,784 individual acts of physical terror were successfully
executed around the world - 68% of which were targeted towards business interests (See Figure
23.0 below). As illustrated in Figure 22.0 below, in 2001 alone, 75% of the 531 terrorist acts on
record were aimed at commercial targets (U.S. Department of State, 2001). Consistent with the
historical data, commercial targets are widely considered to be favored over military,
government, or diplomatic alternatives for several reasons:
> "Softer" or lighter security make them much easier to strike against,
> There is often a high probability of inflicting a significant number of casualties, and
> Commerce and trade are symbolic of the capitalist western economic system that groups
like al Qaeda are intent upon disrupting.
So clearly, terrorism is not just a political or diplomatic problem. Just as an earthquake, a flood,
or a fire at a manufacturing plan can render a supply chain inoperable, so too can a car bomb or a
hi-jacked Boeing 767. Commercial enterprises must take steps to understand their
vulnerabilities and include acts of terrorism in their enterprise resilience strategies. While the
probability of any one company becoming the target of a terrorist attack is likely very remote,
the proximity of assets to high-profile city centers like New York City, Washington, D.C., or
London can certainly increase the chances and is evidenced by the range in terrorism insurance
premiums now becoming widely available to firms operating in the U.S. (see Figure 35.0 in
Chapter 6). Regardless of the perceived risk however (i.e. the probability it occurring), the
impact of a terrorist attack can and should be assessed in the same context as any other potential
disruption - by the impact on the functions of the supply chain - not by the event itself. This
concept will be discussed further in Chapter 5. Three cases - the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, the 1998 Okalahoma City bombing, and the attacks on September 1 1 th, 2001 - are
discussed below to provide accounts of just how devastating these events can be.
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Figure 22.0 - Total Facilities Struck by International Attack, 2001
Source: U.S. Department of State, 2001
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4.7.1 1993 World Trade Center Bombing - 02/26/93 - New York City, NY
At approximately 12:17 p.m. EST on Friday, February 26, 1993, an explosion tore through the
110-story twin towers of New York City's World Trade Center. The source of the blast was
tracked to a van parked on the B-2 level of an underground garage. The rented van had been
packed with nitrates and other explosive materials effectively transforming it into a mobile
device capable of producing significant destructive force. The attack killed six people and
wounded over 1,000 while causing over $300M in property damage. An example of the damage
is shown in Figure 24.0.
According to Anne McCarthy's 1993 article in the Disaster Recovery Journal, over 900
businesses in the World Trade Center were disrupted as a result of the attack, all exhibiting
varying levels of preparedness. "One company, Fiduciary Trust International, was prepared and
implemented their business recovery program even before they knew the cause of the disruption.
'The explosion occurred a little bit after 12:00 noon and even before we knew the extent of the
damage, we had an instinct that this was more than just turning off the power. We invoked our
disaster plan by about 1:00 p.m., long before we had any information about the bomb,'
commented Lawrence Huntington, Chairman of Fiduciary Trust International" (McCarthy,
1993). And for those firms that were not prepared, the 1993 bombing served as a much-needed
wake-up call. Many companies began formal business continuity and disaster recovery
programs that would pay dividends when terrorists targeted the World Trade Center yet again in
2001, that time toppling the twin towers using commercial airplanes as guided missiles. One
such program was initiated by the city government. In 1999, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani opened a
$13 million emergency crisis center located on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade center; a building
near the twin towers. Giuliani intended the center to serve as a command center during city
emergencies, including blackouts, storms and terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, the crisis center
would be destroyed with the twin towers during the September 11 , 2001, attack which made the
coordination of initial response and recovery efforts all the more difficult.
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Figure 24.0 - Bomb Squad Investigators Look for Evidence after 1993 WTC Bombing
Source: Dan Sheehan, NY News Day
4.7.2 Oklahoma City Bombing - 04/19/95 - Oklahoma City, OK
At 9:03 a.m., Wednesday April 19, 1995, the day seemed just like any other day for the residents
of Oklahoma City. One minute later, all of that changed. At 9:04 a.m. CST, a bomb was
detonated in front of the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma
City. The sound from the blast, the worst act of terrorism ever attempted on U.S. soil to that
point, was heard up to 15 miles away. 169 people were killed and several hundred were injured
in the explosion and partial collapse of the building.
The bomb that ripped through the Murrah building that day was composed of two to three tons of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer mixed with combustible fuel oil. It was placed inside of a rented
Ryder truck, which was then parked in front of the north side of the building. The blast
effectively destroyed one-third of the building from roof to ground, leaving a crater eight feet
deep and 30 feet wide (see Figure 25.0 on following page). As described in a 1999 article by
Richard Arnold in the Disaster Recovery Journal, the design of the Alfred P. Murrah building
was fairly simple and plain; a basic cast-poured concrete and glass structure not unlike many
large office structures seen in city centers across the United States. However, to create an
aesthetic entrance, four main support columns were exposed at the front entrance and ran the full
height of the first and second floors. This design effect created an atrium at the street level
(Arnold, 1999). Unfortunately, it also left the structure vulnerable to a well-placed ammonium
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nitrate bomb. When the blast hit, it knocked out three of the four support columns. So when the
second and third floors failed, the higher floors tore away from the compromised structure and
collapsed one on top of another, thus creating somewhat of a tragic domino effect.
The building housed several federal offices including the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau
of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Veterans Administration, and the Social Security Administration. It also
held a day-care center and a variety of civilian businesses, including a day-care center and the
Oklahoma Federal Credit Union, a case that is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The destruction
was not limited to the Murrah building however. Several buildings in the surrounding area also
sustained damage also. Located directly across the street, both the Oklahoma Water Resources
and the Journal Records buildings suffered extensive damage to windows and exterior walls.
And as one indicator of the bomb's destructive force, parts of the federal building were actually
blown into the facades of these nearby office buildings. For seven days immediately following
the blast, all property within an entire eight-block radius of ground zero was closed to the
general public. As it was considered a crime scene, security was very tight, making it difficult
for corporate recovery teams to assess the damage to their respective office locations. This only
exasperated the situation for those businesses located within the blast radius.
Figure 25.0 - Bomb Damage to Murrah Federal Building
I Is 1
Source: The Associated Press
http://www.azstamet.comipublic/packages/okc verdict/
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4.7.3 9/11 Terrorist Attacks - 09/11/01 - NYC, DC, PA
On the morning hours of September 11, 2003, the worst international terrorist attack in modem
history occurred in the United States. A well-planned and highly organized strike - involving
the simultaneous hijacking of four U.S. commercial airliners - was directed at multiple targets in
New York City and Washington D.C. As outlined in a 2002 U.S. Department of State report,
five terrorists hijacked American Airlines flight 11, which departed Boston for Los Angeles at
7:45 a.m. At approximately 8:45 a.m., the plane was deliberately flown into the North Tower of
the World Trade Center in New York City, NY. Five terrorists commandeered American
Airlines flight 175, which departed Boston for Los Angeles at 7:58 a.m. At 9:05 a.m., the plane
was piloted into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Shortly thereafter, both towers
collapsed, killing approximately 3000 people, including hundreds of firefighters and rescue
personnel who had arrived on the scene to treat the injured and help to evacuate the buildings.
Four terrorists hijacked United Airlines flight 93, which departed Newark for San Francisco at
8:01 a.m. At 10:10 a.m., the plane crashed in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania killing all 45
persons on board. While the intended target of this hijacked plane is unknown, officials
speculate that it was headed for Washington D.C. It is also believed that passengers
overpowered the terrorists and forced the plane to crash prematurely in a relatively unpopulated
area of Pennsylvania (U.S. Department of State, 2002).
Five terrorists hijacked American Airlines flight 77, which departed Washington D.C. for Los
Angeles at 8:10 a.m. At 9:39 a.m., the plane was deliberately flown into the Pentagon building
in Arlington, VA. A total of 189 people were killed, including the passengers onboard flight 77.
It is estimated that 10% of the office space in Manhattan was lost on September 11. It would
cost over $5B to replace the towers today.
The direct impact to businesses located within the blast radius was massive. The financial
services industry was particularly hard-hit. As reported in a 2001 Fortune article by Shawn
Tully, of the nearly 5,000 initially thought dead or missing, some 2,000 worked for financial
firms. This meant that one Wall Street worker in 100 was thought to have been lost. In addition,
over 15 million square feet of office space was either completely decimated or badly damaged,
an area equivalent to the entire downtowns of Atlanta or Miami (Tully, 2001). Nearly every
company on Wall Street suffered losses in one or more of the following key areas: people,
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equipment, real estate, and trading capacity. Firms like Cantor Fitzgerald, a case detailed in
Chapter 6, were suddenly faced with the daunting prospect of replacing highly paid traders and
other specialists from a small, exclusive pool of Wall Street elites. And firms like Sidley Austin
Brown & Wood LLP and Merrill Lynch - also profiled in Chapter 6 - suffered virtually a
complete loss of information technology infrastructure that now needed to be replaced by a
plethora of routers, switches, and servers. They weren't alone. Within two days, Dell Computer
had been called by all 85 of its New York clients directly affected by the attack. They quickly
arranged for the shipment of 5,000 PCs and servers by truck; it promised delivery within 24
hours - another example of Dell's ability to deliver for its customers. Some firms however, took
matters into their own hands. According to Tully (2002), "Thacher Proffitt & Wood, a law firm
that normally has 300 people on floors 38 to 40 of Tower 2 (no casualties), didn't wait for Dell to
deliver; it sent a truck to Austin to collect the 400 computers and printers it had ordered" (Tully,
2002).
For the most part, Wall Street firms were uniquely prepared for such an event and responded
well; many were back online with virtually zero downtime. This would never have been the case
were it not for the industry-wide investments in contingency planning that began after the 1987
stock market crash and accelerated after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the Year
2000 scare. Until the 1993 attack, few companies had implemented robust systems for backing
up data or mirroring critical computing power. While the 1993 bombing didn't destroy
significant amounts of data, it did persuade many enterprises to focus on contingency planning
and rapid recovery capabilities. And while only some firms may have made the initial
investments in these areas, the rest of Wall Street quickly followed suit as no single firm could
afford to be any more vulnerable than its competitors. Says Wick Simmons, chairman of the
Nasdaq at the time: "The scare we had in 1993 put into us the fear we always have in such times:
that we'll be down and no one else will" (Tully, 2002).
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Figure 26.0 - Terrorists Strike the World Trade Center, 9/11/01
Source: Disasters of the Last Decade Website
<http://long.linux-dude.net/~cyrille/disaster/mai.php?meU choice=28>
Figure 27.0 - Footprint of WTC Damage, 9/11/01




Disruptions need not be physical in nature to severely interrupt the flow of goods, information,
or funds throughout a supply chain. Any event or scenario that restricts the available capacity of
one or more operating partners, or functional nodes of a network, can be crippling to health of
the system, regardless of the root cause. For example, work stoppages, or even slow-downs, can
be disastrous to the businesses that rely on those services to manufacture and distribute their
products. We will discuss three such events that proved to be just that: the 1993 General Motors
strike, 1997 UPS strike, and the 2002 West Coast Port Lockout. In each case, the effects were
widespread and financially devastating to a great many businesses that were directly or indirectly
linked to the striking, or "locked-out", organizations.
4.8.1 1997 UPS Strike - 08/04/97 - Atlanta, GA
For fifteen days in August, 1997, a company-wide strike at Atlanta, GA-based United Parcel
Service (UPS) brought the carrier's operations to a grinding halt and severely disrupted the flow
of goods across the United States and abroad. The major issues in the strike, which began
August 4, four days after the old contract expired, revolved around part-time work, pensions and
subcontracting. Labor, which was represented by leaders of the Teamsters union, forced UPS
through a grueling fifteen day period of negotiations that had garnered much greater public
support than anticipated while effectively paralyzing many small businesses across the nation
that relied on UPS as their primary, and in some cases only, transportation service provider.
Many such businesses worked exclusively with UPS and did not have the relationships in place
with other that would have facilitated a relatively painless failover solution. Most concede that
they simply did not consider the risk. When these companies tried to shift business to FedEx, or
even USPS, they found that delivery times could not be guaranteed due to the sudden strain on
capacity. In many cases, carriers like FedEx and Airborne would not take on any new business
at all from new customers, citing a commitment to meet expected service levels for their current
customers as the reason. The impact was so great that it was estimated that roughly 300 small
businesses eventually closed as a result of lost sales, business interruptions, and/or significantly
higher shipping costs.
After talks broke down five days into the strike, UPS unsuccessfully sought government
intervention to force labor back to work. President Clinton resisted repeated calls to intervene,
saying that the strike did not threaten national security or health, and therefore it was
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unnecessary for him to get involved. He believed that the solution to the dispute lied on the
bargaining table. His Labor Secretary, Alexis Herman, however was involved in the entire
process of the negotiation.
On Monday night of August 18th, 1997 the UPS and the Teamsters' five day marathon
negotiation finally ended with a contract agreement. In the new contract, the Teamsters received
an increase in pension to $3000 per month for retired employees after working for 30 years. The
pension fund will remain under the control of the union. According to Voorhis (1997), part-time
workers' salary would increase from $11 to $15 per hour, and UPS agreed to create 10,000 full
time jobs over the five year duration of the contract. Although it seemed to be a victory for
organized labor, UPS was forced to lay off many employees in the following months due to loss
of business during the strike, claiming that the company had already lost $650M in revenue.
While the strike certainly cost UPS dearly in lost revenues and disgruntled customers, the loss in
business was a gain competitors like Federal Express, Airborne, RPS, and even the United States
Postal Service. Smaller, up-and-coming delivery companies, such as Eastern Connection in
Wellesley, MA also made gains. At Eastern, a $30M overnight delivery company, drivers are
delivering 9,000 packages a day, up from 6,000 before the UPS strike, according to company
officials (Voorhis, 1997).
4.8.2 1998 General Motors Strike - 06/05/98 - Flint, MI
On June 5th and June Ith, 1998, respectively, strikes by members of the United Auto Workers
659 and 651 in Flint, MI resulted in the shutdown of two General Motors (GM) component
plants. Those stoppages resulted in parts shortages that eventually led to the shutdown of most
of GM's North American assembly plants in late June and early July. The core reason for the
conflict between GM and the UAW lied in GM's desire to utilize outsourcing to improve its
competitive position. Union work rules had been preventing the company from reaping the
benefits of new equipment investments. As Nauss reports in a 1998 article, workers in many
sectors worked "under a quota system that allowed them to stop work once their production
targets were met. This means workers could put in 4.5 to 6.5 hours but get paid for 8 hours of
work. As a result, production lines were running at only slightly more than half of the available
capacity" (Nauss, 1998).
On July 28, 1998, the work stoppages at both facilities were finally resolved. From the
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beginning of the third quarter to the point that normal production levels were resumed, the strike
resulted in an estimated loss of 318,000 units. The loss of production had an estimated after-tax
impact of $1.2B; $965M for GM Automotive Operations and $270M for its Delphi Automotive
Systems parts division. The effects of the strike were also felt by the various industries that were
either suppliers to or customers of GM. H.B. Fuller, a maker of adhesives, sealants, coatings,
and paints experienced significantly lower third quarter earnings as a result of the lost GM
business. Dana Corp. (engine components), Excel Industries (doorframes), Gentex (car mirrors),
and Westcast Industries (exhaust systems) all reported reduced earnings due to the GM strike.
The earnings of several steel companies were also negatively impacted as third quarter demand
for steel products plummeted. While virtually all of GM's suppliers suffered, the effects of the
work stoppage rippled forward as well. The Washington Post's earnings were slowed due to a
decline in advertising revenue on its television stations and in its Newsweek Magazine (The
Washington Post, 1998).
4.8.3 West Coast Port Lockout - 09/29/02 - Western U.S.
On Friday September 27, 2002, at 6:00p.m, the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) locked their
doors on 10,500 International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) dockworkers. The
PMA locked their doors as a result of a collaborative "work slowdown" by the union employees,
who cut their productivity by at least 50%. ILWU spokespersons insist that they did not
slowdown their work capacity, if fact they were instructed by their employer (PMA) to follow
safety procedures more closely, since in the past seven months. Five union dockworkers had
died while on the job.
The PMA planned to unlock their doors on Sunday September 29, at 8:00a.m, but shortly after
they opened, they shut down and locked the doors again, insisting that the union employees were
continuing their collaborative slowdown. Slowdowns can be more detrimental to company than
a full-scale strike, because slowdowns throw off the scheduling patterns for the ships coming in,
and the trucks going out to deliver the cargo to the factories that use just-in-time inventories.
This was the first west coast port stoppage since a 134-day strike back in 1971.
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Both the domestic and global economies were seriously affected by the lockout. The U.S
economy alone is $10.4 trillion per year, or $28.4B per day. This means that the west coast's
import/export ports provide 7% of the daily total. The west coast ports, from San Diego to
Portland Oregon, bring in $300B dollars of cargo each year, or $1 to $2B per day. The west
coast handles 54% of the nation's imports and exports. Hawaii was particularly vulnerable as it
imports 90% of its goods and significant percentage of that 90% comes from the west coast.
Additionally, the Port of Oakland is the number one route used to ship technologies coming out
of the Silicon Valley.
The manufacturing, retailing and agriculture industries were most vulnerable. An auto
manufacturing plant in Fremont, Calif. was forced to shut down production, idling 5,000
workers. The NUMMI plant, a joint venture of General Motors and Toyota that is discussed in
detail in Chapter 5, makes the Chevrolet Prizm, Toyota Corolla and Toyota Tacoma pickup
trucks. MSNBC's Martin Wolk reported that "although businesses had at least three months to
prepare for the shutdown, the fragile economic environment may have made some retailers
unable or unwilling to accumulate heavy inventories. In addition, much of the affected cargo was
seasonal, and much was perishable" (Wolk, 2002).
4.9 Financial Distress
It was Andrew Carnegie, the famed steel magnate and one-time richest man in the world, who
suggested that one should "put all your eggs into one basket - and watch the basket." Many
companies that have turned to sole-sourcing procurement strategies as a way to reduce
production costs have learned the hard way what can happen if you take your eyes off of the
basket. The global slump that followed the bull market years of the 1990s made for extremely
challenging economic conditions for business operating in virtually every industry. As a result,
many companies failed to remain solvent and bankruptcies became commonplace. While this
was certainly a negative turn of events for the insolvent firms, it also proved troublesome for the
customers that relied upon them, particularly in a sole-source supply relationship. Using a
single supplier for one or more critical components effectively binds a manufacturer's fiscal
health to that of its supplier. If a supplier suddenly becomes unable to supply parts, it is only a
matter of time before its sole-source customer(s) is unable to produce its respective products.
And with the rapid adoption of lean manufacturing and just-in-time inventory systems, the
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"matter of time" has been slashed to just days, or even hours in some cases. There is
increasingly little margin for error.
For this reason, it is imperative for any manufacturer that chooses to enter a sole-source supply
relationship maintain an intimate operating relationship with its supplier. In theory, a company
and its sole supplier are in a partnership where both gain from cooperation in design,
engineering, logistics, and costs. At the very least, it is in the company's best interest to ensure
that their sole source remains financially viable and capable to fulfill its contractual
responsibilities. In many cases, a periodic review of a supplier's financial health will suffice.
Financial woes are rarely sudden and therefore can be detected well before insolvency becomes a
real threat. For example, in the Land Rover case discussed below, the problem could have been
discovered using simple financial ratios such as Debt-to-Asset leverage or the Current Ratio,
which are defined below:
In a healthy supply relationship, a firm should be able to rely on its partner to alert them of any
impending issues, rather than its own due diligence. However, as Land Rover found out, this is
not always the case.. .regardless of how strong the relationship may be perceived to be.
4.9.1 Land Rover/UPF-Thompson Case - 12/15/01 - UK
In December, 2001, UPF-Thompson, the sole supplier of chassis frames for Land Rover's
popular Discovery models, suddenly stopped shipping product. They had suddenly and
unexpectedly become insolvent and were forced to claim bankruptcy protection. According to
Michael Marecki, Director of Legal Affairs for Jaguar, Land Rover, and Aston Martin, "the way
[they] learned of this was that one Friday morning no chassis frames were delivered" (Hoult,
2002). And the matter was made more complicated by the fact that Land Rover typically only
received delivery of the frames two days before they were due to be used on the production line,
as they no longer had the room to store them with the adoption of Ford's just-in-time inventory
system.
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Many critics pointed out that Land Rover should never have relied on a single source for such a
crucial component. At one point, a lawyer from KPMG, who were the receivers of UPF-
Thompson, suggested that Land Rover source its supplies from more than one manufacturer, but
Marecki was quick to point out that the Land Rover/UPF relationship went back a long time.
Land Rover had actually given them business on the strength of that relationship even when they
were not the lowest bidder (Hoult, 2002).
In this case, the supply crisis threatened to bring to a halt a product line that accounted for
roughly one third of total revenues. Land Rover countered this by noting that single-sourcing
was accepted throughout the auto industry as normal. Following the example of many leading
Japanese auto manufacturers, Land Rover sourced over 90% of its components from single
suppliers, citing high quality through continuous improvement and low costs through volume
discounts as the driving forces behind the strategy. But it was not only Land Rover's reliance on
a single supplier that had created such a huge problem for Land Rover; the company's
vulnerability was also compromised by their new lean inventory system. Before Ford took over
the company in May 2000, Land Rover typically had several months of inventory in the
distribution pipeline. But under lean distribution, any disruption in the flow of components
affected Land Rover immediately.
Only when Land Rover contacted UPF to determine the cause of the shipping delay did they
become aware of the true gravity of the situation. UPF's receivers, KPMG, told Land Rover
they were not prepared to deliver any more frames unless the company was willing to make a
multi-million pound "goodwill" payment. This put Land Rover in a very difficult position as
finding a new supplier would have suspended Discovery production for up to nine months while
tooling was developed and led to 1,400 lay-offs at the company's assembly plant. An additional
10,000 jobs among Land Rover's other suppliers would also have been severely threatened.
Shortly after this, Land Rover received written notification from KPMG asking it to buy the
business or agree to a long-term supply contract. Land Rover was in big trouble and KPMG was
well aware of the manufacturer's dependence on the flow of chassis from UPF, explicitly
pointing out during a follow-up meeting that Land Rover would suffer catastrophic
consequences if it did continue to receive frames. Land Rover, refusing to be strong-armed,
rejected the offer and opted for arbitration.
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After weeks of failed negotiations, the two took their cases to England's High Court, where a
judge found KPMG's demands to be "arguably illegal" and granted an injunction preventing
them from carrying out any of their threats, guaranteeing the flow of chassis on an interim basis
(Hoult, 2002). After a lengthy series of appeals and additional hearings, the two parties
eventually came to an agreement as to how the dispute would be settled. The final settlement
entailed Land Rover paying between fLOM and E20M of UPF's E50M debt in exchange for the
replacement of KPMG with its preferred receiver.
While the flow of chassis never completely took down the Discovery assembly line, it came
dangerously close. As Lester reported in his 2002 article, while Land Rover claims that it "keeps
a careful and continuous financial review of all its suppliers, delving into order books and
business and revenue plans (Lester, 2002)," UPF somehow managed to slip through the net. In
the end, Land Rover was forced to absorb a portion of the supplier's debt to keep them
financially viable and capable of supplying them with an uninterrupted flow of auto chassis.
Had the company taken steps to maintain a tighter relationship with the UPF, the crisis may have
been averted. But as it was, Land Rover took its eyes off of the "basket" and was left with a few
broken eggs.
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Chapter 5: Vulnerabilities of the Modern Supply Chain
5.1 Survey of the Modern Supply Chain
As described in previous chapters, the modem supply chain can be extremely complex and
fragile. Figure 28.0 below illustrates an example of a basic multi-tiered, multi-node supply
network - one that can be found in a wide variety of product-oriented industries. Raw materials
flow from suppliers to manufacturing centers and finished goods flow from the manufacturing
centers to regional/local warehouses/distribution centers to one or more retail outlets and finally
to the end consumers. However, recent trends have made for a much less linear and much more
complex flow of goods, information, and funds across the supply chain.
Global outsourcing has pushed much supply chain functionality and responsibility out to 3r_
parties (contract manufacturers, 3PLs, transportation service providers, component/assembly
suppliers, etc.) spread across an increasingly dispersed geographic area. In fact, modem
product-oriented companies may not own a single plant, truck, or warehouse! Concurrently, the
drive towards lean operations (JIT, etc.) has made supply chains very efficient but also very
fragile, where a disruption at any node in the network can severely impact the overall flow of
products, information, and funds. So in practice, an enterprise's supply network is often much
more complex, however, for the purposes of this discussion, this simplified model will suffice.
Figure 28.0 - Modern Networked Supply Chain
Supplier(s) Manufacturer(s) Warehouse(s)/DC(s) Retail Outlet(s) Customer(s)
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5.2 Supply Chain Failure Modes
To reduce the task of planning for an infinite array of potential supply chain disruptions into an
endeavor that is both manageable and useful, it is important to focus not on the specific nature of
the disruption, but on how supply chain operations are likely to be impacted. In other words,
organizations should focus on the failure modes, not on the failures themselves!
There are two primary reasons for this:
1. Firms cannot foresee every potential threat, let alone the probability of each threat
coming to fruition. It simply isn't feasible, nor would it be practical. For example, prior
to September 1 1 th, 2001, it would have been unreasonable to expect most firms to have
planned for a commercial airplane hitting their building.
2. Companies do not have to! As this study will describe, a very wide variety of disruptive
events - whether they be earthquakes, hurricanes, ice storms, terrorist attacks, labor
strikes, or supplier bankruptcy - tend to have very similar effects on the supply chain.
That is to say that while the root cause of a disruptive event may vary significantly over time, the
impact on that event on the supply chain is likely to be very similar. So by analyzing the supply
chain as a network of interconnected operational nodes and understanding the potential failure
points within that network, firms can mitigate much of their risk regardless of the specific type of
disruption the future may hold. These "potential failure points" are referred to as a supply
chain's failure modes throughout much of this thesis. The six failure modes that provide the
framework for this study are:
> Non-IT Physical Infrastructure
> IT/Communication Infrastructure




The remainder of Chapter 5 is devoted to describing these failure modes and exploring the
different ways that they can be compromised, through a series of case studies, by the various
types of disruptive events surveyed in Chapter 4.
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5.2.1 Physical Infrastructure Disruption (Non-IT)
This refers to the scenario where a firm's physical assets (i.e. non-IT) were directly impacted by
a disruptive event. For any number of reasons (earthquake, hurricane, power outage, terrorist
attack, etc.), a company is faced with the task of to re-locating and recovering significant
operational assets in order to continue doing business. This could apply to key business
functions, manufacturing capabilities, or even employees. Figure 29.0 below describes the
impact of such a disruption on the flow of physical goods and/or information throughout the
generic supply network. In addition, two cases - the Oklahoma Federal Credit Union and the
New York Board of Trade - are outlined below to provide accounts of how this type of failure
mode can occur, what it means for a firm, and how two such firms responded.
Figure 29.0 - Potential Impact of Infrastructure Disruption
___
Supplier(s) Manufacturer(s) Warehouse(s)/DC(s) Retail Outlet(s) Customer(s)
nX n X n X n X
- Flow of Physical Goods
4- - - - - - - Flow of Data / Communicatains
Patanlial Disruption Point(s)
5.2.1.1 Oklahoma Federal Employee Credit Union - 04/16/95 - Terrorist Attack
Just after 9:00 a.m. on April 19, 1995, a powerful bomb ripped through the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, proving to be one of the most brutal terrorist
attacks in ever carried out on U.S. soil, second only to the events of September 1 1li*. The blast,
caused by a two to three ton device comprised of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and combustible
fuel oil, destroyed one-third of the nine-story building from roof to ground and left a crater that
was eight feet deep and over 30 feet wide. In all, 169 people were killed in the explosion that
could be heard up to fifteen miles away. Of the various federal and private offices housed in the
Murrah building - including the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. Customs
Service, the Veterans Administration, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Development -
the Oklahoma Federal Employee Credit Union (FECU) was dealt perhaps the fiercest blow.
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While most of the building's tenants were branches of larger federal organizations, FECU was
wholly located in the smoldering structure.
The FECU, located on the third floor, served over 15,000 members and held roughly $75M in
deposits and other assets. As Grayson Towler reports in his 1999 article on the event, "all
information technology (IT) and infrastructure, all telecommunications equipment, all records,
and all files were utterly laid to waste. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in checks, traveler's
checks, and cash vanished into the smoldering rubble" (Towler, 1999). It was the human loss
however, that was the most devastating. Of the credit union's 33 employees, 18 were killed in
the blast, five were hospitalized with serious injuries, and the rest were left severely traumatized
by the disaster that they had just witnessed. But with only three employees and the aid of
numerous volunteers, FECU was re-opened for business by Friday morning, just 48 hours after
the tragic bombing.
FECU's miraculous recovery can be attributed to three factors: a sound disaster recovery
strategy, the support and assistance from other credit unions, and a little bit of good luck.
Because the credit union already had a comprehensive yet flexible recovery plan in place, there
was little doubt or confusion as to where recovery efforts should be directed in the hours and
days following the attack. But it was only through the generosity of others and the fortunate
survival of its key leadership structure that it was possible to for the plan to be implemented so
successfully. As Towler notes, "amongst the survivors were CEO Florence Rogers, Vice
President and Comptroller Raymond Stroud, and the FECU data processing specialist, Brad
Grant. It was by sheer coincidence that Grant and Stroud were both out of town at the time.
Florence Rogers was in the building when the blast struck - her survival is a miracle in and of
itself. Thus, when the smoke cleared, the Credit Union had suffered an awful loss, but it did have
the three key people it needed for recovery there to help restore it" (Towler, 1999).
A cornerstone of FECU's ongoing disaster recovery strategy was the off-site storage of all daily
tape backups at a third-party disaster recovery facility managed by The Rock Island Group
(RIG). Soon after the blast hit and RIG was contacted, they were able to ship a complete set of
backup data to a hot site in Pennsylvania. And by the very next day, FECU was retrieving
records and data at the hot site. The recovery had begun. While the short-term data restoration
was underway at the emergency failover site, FECU also contracted RIG to begin rebuilding the
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company's long-term transaction management capabilities and overall technology platform.
In the meantime, the surviving leadership team quickly mobilized to address the many non-
technical aspects of the recovery. At 4:30 p.m. the day of the blast, an emergency session of the
board was called. In addition to the CEOs of FECU and RIG, key leaders from seven other local
credit unions were in attendance as well. Action was quick and decisive. The credit union
executives would organize volunteers from their respective organizations and arrange for the
personnel required to provide FECU with a functional staff. In addition, Matthew Stratton, CEO
of nearby Tinker Credit Union, would manage the media and all public relations (PR) efforts.
And because RIG, a third-party not located in the Oklahoma City area, was removed from the
personal trauma that the members of the local credit union community were experiencing, it was
deemed best suited to handle many of the remaining logistics of FECU's recovery. This included
establishing an alternate branch location, which leveraged a training facility operated by one of
the local credit unions. This alternate site would house the FECU until more permanent
arrangements could be made. That left Florence Rogers, FECU's CEO, tasked with setting the
strategic vision of the credit union and free to deal with the pain, suffering, and death of her
coworkers, their families, and the credit union's members.
Although easy to overlook, Matthew Stratton's PR efforts were critical to the recovery process.
His team organized press releases, ran radio commercials, and advertised in the local newspaper
that FECU would be back online soon and that their members' needs would be met. Many
members, confused and fearing that their deposits might be compromised, were reassured by the
public declarations that FECU would continue to serve them. In addition, Towler notes that
"local businesses, which initially feared that the FECU checks were no longer viable, were
quickly and quietly informed that the credit union could still honor its payments" (Towler,
1999). These efforts were just as important as the work that RIG and the other credit unions
were doing to restore IT systems, establish an alternate branch location, and arrange staffing.
When the FECU re-opened just 48 hours after the bombing, over 500 members visited the
alternate site. While much of the physical rebuilding was behind them, the emotional and
spiritual recovery had only just begun. As Towler observed, "not only were the employees of
FECU and the volunteers struck afresh by the impact of the disaster because of their own
experiences in returning to work, but they had to cope with the fact that over 90% of the workers
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in the Murrah Federal Building were members of the credit union, including virtually all of the
missing and dead" (Towler, 1999). In addition to overseeing the reconstruction of the FECU
business infrastructure and technology platform, executives and staff dealt daily with the human
loss. But through it all, the credit union remained open for business.
Several insights can be gleaned from FECU's miraculous recovery. After suffering a complete
loss of operating assets and information, as well as most of their staff, they were able to re-open
their doors a mere 48 hours later. First, the fact that FECU had invested the time and resources
to create a disaster recovery plan, which called for, among other things, keeping its computer
backups offsite was critical to their resilience. If the credit union had hot made backups, or had
it kept them in close proximity to their branch office (i.e. in the same building), it could never
have recovered from the destruction that it suffered. They also wisely chose to let an outside
firm manage as much of the logistical needs of the business as possible. This allowed them to
focus on the physical and mental well-being of their employees and customers. FECU's
experience also highlights how "media management becomes vital in a case where customers of
a business might be confused about the well-being of that business. In such a high-profile
situation, the fact that the attention of virtually all the customers was guaranteed to be focused on
the media worked to the advantage of the public relations team" (Towler, 1999). In summary,
FECU learned that having a disaster recovery strategy in place, while necessary, is not altogether
sufficient. Execution is equally important. The Oklahoma Federal Employee Credit Union was
successful only because they demonstrated excellence in both.
5.2.1.2 New York Board of Trade - 09/11/01 - Terrorist Attack
As with virtually every other organization with office space in or around the twin towers of the
World Trade Center on September 1 1 th, 2001, the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) was
suddenly left homeless in the aftermath of the al Qaeda terrorist attacks that toppled the towers
and decimated much of the surrounding area. Unlike most other organizations however,
especially those outside the financial services industry, they were ready with a backup hot site on
standby for just such an emergency. As Carol Sliwa reports in her 2001 Computerworld.com
article, NYBOT learned its lesson after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and began
investing in a "hot site" in Queens, NY that they could failover to in the event that either their
main trading floor or central IT systems, or both, were rendered non-operational (Sliwa, 2001).
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Prior to 1993, their disaster recovery capability consisted of a vacant "cold site" in Philadelphia
that they rented from SunGard Data Systems Inc. Cold sites contain only the requisite backup
hardware and network and must be activated from scratch using backup data tapes. Hot sites, on
the other hand, are actual live systems that function as virtual mirrors of the primary technology
platform. While hot sites are more desirable from a disaster recovery perspective, they are also
much more expensive to maintain than a cold side. The NYBOT's hot site cost them $300,000
per year, which bought them space for a trading floor and a backup Compaq Himalaya 72000
mainframe computer at a business-recovery facility owned by Rosemont, Ill.-based Comdisco
Inc. According to CEO Mark Fichtel: "That was a hot topic at the last budget cycle: Why should
we continue to spend $300,000 for something we'll never use? That's what insurance is all
about. You hate paying the premiums, but you're sure glad you did when you have to collect"
(Sliwa, 2001).
The firm continued to invest in the Queens, NY hot site, but refused to let it lie dormant until the
next disaster came around. The Board of Trade also used the backup system as a development
environment where it could code and test software updates to its production environment before
actually implementing them in the primary system. They also used it to exercise their failover
capability. Sliwa goes on to describe how, "on a quarterly basis, IT staffers descended on the
deserted Queens facility to test the disaster plan, much as they might conduct a fire drill. A
typical test would run an hour and 45 minutes. 'No one liked to do it,' said Ian Nelson, vice
president of technical operations. 'It always meant coming in on a Saturday and spending a
beautiful day here."' (Sliwa, 2001) In an ironic twist of fate, the test scheduled for September
8h had been moved to September 1 5th because of some utility work being performed at their
headquarters in the World Trade Center complex.
But because of the firm's investment in disaster recovery capability and their disciplined
approach to practice and training, they were ready when the unthinkable happened on September
Ilth and the plan had to be implemented for real. This was not a drill. The recovery was
executed as planned and all systems were restored within a couple days. As Sliwa describes:
"Trades on Tuesday -the day of the attack - got settled that night, and clearings were done
Wednesday. IT staffers worked to get software to clearing partners as quickly as they could. By
Friday, the Board of Trade was ready for a test run, and on Saturday it did a walk-through with
members at the temporary site. On Monday, trading commenced" (Sliwa, 2001). That did not
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mean, however, that the transition was seamless. The NYBOT soon learned that there were
several minor holes in their recovery strategy. For example, employees lost contact in saved e-
mail when it was discovered that several applications running on Windows NT were not backed
up. The firm also learned a painful lesson in backing up and safeguarding data. The backup
tapes that it would need to restore its financial records were sitting in a 4ft. x 6ft. fireproof safe
buried beneath many layers of rubble at ground zero in lower Manhattan. Much of the data had
to be reconstructed from outside sources.
But outside of a few minor details, the New York Board of Trade made a brilliant recovery. The
once-contentious $300,000 insurance policy had paid off in spades. Says NYBOT CEO Fichtel:
"Whether it takes a month or even a few days to return to it headquarters, Fichtel said the
$300,000 insurance policy was worth it" (Sliwa, 1999). He goes on to note that: "if you're not
ready and you are effectively shut down for any length of time, it is a very competitive world,
and people will take your business away from you" (Sliwa, 1999). Because the Board of Trade
was ready, it was able to react to the September 1 1th attacks and ensured that traders would have
somewhere to do business, with both a trading floor and a stable computing platform, when
trading commenced just a few days later on September 17 *
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5.2.2 IT/Communication Disruption
In this scenario, it is the organization's IT assets (data, communications, applications, etc.) that
are primarily affected by the disruptive event. Perhaps none of there operational capabilities
were compromised, but the underlying technology infrastructure was. And in this increasingly
IT-dependent business environment, that problem is at least as significant, if not more so.
Figure 30.0 below describes the impact of such a disruption on the flow of physical goods and/or
information throughout the generic supply network. In addition, three cases - ING Property &
Casualty, Merrill Lynch, and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP - are outlined below to provide
accounts of how this type of failure mode can occur, what it means for a frm, and how three
such firms responded.
Figure 30.0 - Potential Impact of IT Disruption
Supplier(s) Manufacturer(s) Warehouse(s)/DC(s) Retail Outlet(s) Customer(s)
nX .n nX nX tnXa
- Flow of Physical Goods
---- --- Flow of Data / Comnunications
* Potential Disruption Point(s)
5.2.2.1 ING Canada Property & Casualty - 01/15/98 - Quebec Ice Storm
One of the hardest hit casualties of the 1998 Quebec Ice Storm, the massive ice storm that
blasted parts of New York State, New England, Quebec and Ontario, was the power grid.
Dennis Bueckert (1998) of the Associated Press reported that over 1,000 transmission tower and
30,000 utility poles failed under the burden of several layers of heavy ice (Bueckert, 1998). The
extent of the damage is described further in Figure 44.0, an appendix item that shows the status
of HydroQuebec's electric grid during peak storm conditions. Downed power lines resulted in
extended outages that wreaked havoc on the operation of information technology facilities
located within the affected areas. A division of International Netherlands Group, ING Canada
Property and Casualty, headquartered in Montreal, was particularly hard-hit. ING was an
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industry leader with over half a million customers and counted customer service and satisfaction
as top priorities and something that differentiated it from competitors. Several years earlier, ING
made the decision to outsource the operation of its central data center in Saint-Hyacinthe,
Quebec to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). A hot site recovery agreement was also in
place with Comdisco, a leading disaster recovery specialist.
According to a case study by prepared by Philip Rothstein in March 1998, when the first wave of
the ice storm hit at around 10 a.m. on January 7, 1998, a Wednesday, the data center quickly lost
power. As expected, an uninterruptible power system (UPS) and backup generator effectively
took over the short-term load for ING's mainframe (Rothstein, 1998). So far, so good.
Unfortunately, the power outage would not prove to be a short-term inconvenience. Operations
were estimated to be impacted for over two weeks. ING, CSC, and Comdisco went to work
planning for the extended outage. Says Robert Proulx, First Vice President of Technology and
Systems for ING: "Three major risk factors were identified: (1) power, (2) the
telecommunications network serving all of Canada, and (3) people. An important characteristic
was that [they] were facing a major issue - because of downed poles and wires in the road -
getting people to the data center" (Rothstein, 1998). Proulx advised Comdisco that night that
ING was formally declaring a disaster, prompting Comdisco to activate their Toronto, Ontario
recovery center. Although the Saint-Hyacinthe location was up and running on backup power,
they understood that backup systems were designed to run for hours or maybe even days, but
certainly not for weeks. The situation was also complicated by the fact that the fuel tank on the
back up generator was only half full for a maximum runtime of 24 hours and the chance of
getting a fuel delivery within the next 24 hours was uncertain at best. Operations were
immediately transitioned to Toronto.
In the meantime, data traffic was also beginning to spike. According to Rothstein, "ING's
property and casualty claims processing exceeded five times normal volume" throughout the
ordeal and "ING elected to continue claims operations straight through the weekend,
compounding the already high stress level on their information systems" (Rothstein, 1998). As
the power outage continued, management was forced to make decision after decision, always
carefully considering the risks and the likely benefits of each alternative. For example, the chose
to immediately install a backup generator and continue running from the Saint-Hyacinthe
location rather than risk transitioning live operations to the backup site while in the midst of a
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major traffic spike. Loss of data and customer service were the primary concerns.
During the twelve days that ING operated on generator power from the Saint-Hyacinthe site,
they were running in parallel with Comdisco's Toronto recovery site as well. As a precaution,
they took backups and refreshed the system on a nightly basis at the recovery site so they were
never more than about eight hours out of synch with their primary systems. Utility power
returned to Saint-Hyacinthe the following weekend, however, ING chose to remain on generator
power for several days. "Proulx worried that utility power would continue to be unstable for
some time as continuing repairs added load to the power grid, and as weakened or damaged
power supply components failed once power was reapplied. At Proulx's Montreal office, he was
unnerved by four power drops during one afternoon" (Rothstein, 1998). Eventually, utility
power did stabilize and all operations were restored to normal.
There are several reasons for ING's success, not least of all the concern that the insurer placed
on the employees that were keeping the systems running. "Long hours, tremendous workloads
and unreasonable stress were only part of the problem. Housing, feeding and caring for hundreds
of employees - many displaced from their homes and dealing with personal crises - was
essential. [They] were serving over 800 lunches, 700 dinners and 700 breakfasts each day [at
Saint-Hyacinthe]. [They] even had to install showers. Many people were working fourteen or
fifteen hours a day at five degrees Celsius" (Rothstein, 1998). ING also exercised superb
planning and execution. Long before the ice storm, they recognized the potential impact of a
data center disruption and had the foresight to develop a contingency plan. As Rothstein notes:
"Thanks to a combination of advance planning, extensive testing and fast footwork in the clinch
to deal with last-minute revelations, communications were successfully rerouted and,
remarkably, ING Canada Property & Casualty never stopped doing business with their
customers throughout the Ice Age of 1998" (Rothstein, 1998).
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5.2.2.2 Merrill Lynch - 09/11/01 - Terrorist Attack
When terrorists brought down the twin towers of the World Trade Center on September 11th
2001, Merrill Lynch and Co. suddenly found itself without its world headquarters. One of the
world's leading financial management and advisory firms, Merrill Lynch occupied several floors
of the World Financial Center, located directly across the street from the World Trade Center
towers. Additional Merrill Lynch office buildings in close proximity to ground zero were also
affected, displacing a total of 9,000 employees. However, general preparedness, sound
contingency planning, and disciplined testing allowed the financial powerhouse to absorb the
shock and return to normal operations while barely skipping a beat. "According to Paul Honey,
Director of Global Contingency Planning, the financial firm was able to successfully evacuate
their headquarters and resume critical management functions within minutes of the terrorist
attack"(Ballman, 2001).
Almost immediately after the first plane struck, the company's emergency management jumped
into action and initiated the evacuation process. And "within just a few minutes of the
evacuation, Merrill Lynch was able to switch its critical management functions to their command
center in New Jersey, explained Honey. Since the command center had been pre-designated in
corporate-wide contingency plans, all personnel immediately knew where to dial into and
transfer information. This allowed transactions throughout the company's global offices to
continue as usual"(Ballman, 2001).
While the World Financial Center, where Merrill Lynch had its headquarters, was not toppled in
the attack, it did sustain many broken windows and suffered extensive damage from fallen
debris. But because the building was located within the area defined as 'ground zero', tenants
would not be granted access, outside of the opportunity to perform an initial damage assessment,
for up to several weeks or longer. The entire area would be cordoned off to facilitate rescue and
recovery operations. Merrill Lynch would have to find somewhere else for its 9,000 displaced
employees to work. Managers immediately got to work locating available office space.
Fortunately, the did not have to look far, or even outside the company. Explained Honey,
"[they] took advantage of all existing Merrill facilities." Miraculously, they had 8,000
employees back at work by Monday, September 17 th. And when exchanges re-opened the same
day, Merrill Lynch was ready and prepared to operate from its alternate location(s) for as long as
it had to. Commenting just after the transition, Honey declared that "it has taken a massive
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effort by all of our employees, but it is business as usual at Merrill Lynch. We were very, very
well prepared"(Ballman, 2001).
Much of the company's success can be attributed to the disciplined nature by which it
approached contingency planning; plans were tested extensively and constantly upgraded as
environmental conditions changed. In fact, the firm had recently tested their plans via a scenario
that, while not a terrorist attack, was a disaster of similar scope and had an analogous impact on
operations. Their rigorous Year-2000 (Y2K) preparations also proved to be invaluable in
conditioning the firm to respond and recover in a time of crisis. Says Honey: "The Y2K tests
really helped us to prepare for this event. During that time, we had 60 command centers around
the world. We honed our plans and tested them, and have since improved our contingency
planning efforts. We learned a lot during the Y2K planning stages and leveraged that knowledge
to upgrade and improve our command center operations" (Ballman, 2001).
The support of senior management was another reason that Merrill Lynch was so successful in
their recovery efforts. Managers accurately recognized the risks and the impact of downtime to
their business, regardless of the cause. They understood the need for continuous upgrading and
testing of corporate contingency plans and committed significant firm resources to ensure that
they were as prepared as they could be for whatever calamity may lie in their future. As Honey
notes, "We are actively involved in keeping our plan current and are even backing up our backup
plans" (Ballman, 2001).
The third key to Merrill Lynch's success lied in their focus on the well-being of their employees.
With all of the focus on hot-sites, IT redundancy, and data integrity, they never lost site of the
fact that it was the employees that made everything go. Management readily acknowledges that
the most important aspect of the recovery was on the human side and expressed great concern for
the health of their staff. For example, the firm ensured that emotional/psychological assistance
was made available for all employees that needed it, bringing in counselors that had consulted
with victims of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. In summary, Merrill Lynch made the best
of a tragic situation with sound preparation, made possible with executive support for
contingency planning initiatives, and an unwavering focus on the well-being of their people.
Because as Honey concludes, "[their] employees are the firm's greatest asset" (Ballman, 2001).
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5.2.2.3 Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP - 09/11/01 - Terrorist Attack
On September 1 0 h, 2001, Sidley, Austin, Brown, & Wood LLP (SABW), was a multi-national
law firm with staff of 1,500 lawyers (3,000 total employees) working from fourteen offices in six
countries. Two of those offices were located in New York City, one of which supported 600
employees in the North Tower of the World Trade Center. In the days leading up to the
September I Ith terrorist attacks, SABW was engaged in one of the largest law firm mergers ever
and was still in the process of the consolidating the firms' multiple technology platforms. As
discussed in a disaster recovery presentation given by SABW's Joy Heath-Porter at the 2002
LawNet conference: "the firms were on two networks with two different hubs, two different e-
mail and document management systems, and two different telephony systems" (Heath-Porter,
2002). In fact, they had just moved equipment to the WTC the previous weekend to facilitate the
consolidation.
At approximately 8:45 a.m. on Tuesday, September 11th, American Airlines flight 11 was
deliberately flown into the North Tower of the World Trade by its al-Qaeda hijackers. The
firm's pending merger and technology consolidation initiative suddenly became the least of its
worries. Fortunately, all of SABW's employees that were in the WTC office at the time escaped
unharmed. Once all employees were accounted for, management immediately went into damage
control mode. By mid-morning, a disaster steering group had been assembled, which began to
map out a recovery strategy. The recovery of office IT systems and office space were the
primary concerns. By noon, the firm had contacted its off-site storage provide and arrangements
were made to drive the office's backup data tapes to SABW's Chicago office where system
recovery would occur. Because the firm took a self-proclaimed "maniacal" approach to tape
backups, backing up daily and transferring the tapes to an offsite storage location outside the
NYC metropolitan area, all but only a couple of hours of data could be recovered. This would
prove to be a key success factor for SABW's recovery.
While plans were being developed and executed for the firm's IT recovery, they also took steps
to reassure their many worried employees that were calling in from around the globe. They
established an 800 number, which was posted on its corporate website, for employees and
ensured that it was staffed by live operators so that staff calling in would have a "live" voice to
talk to. By Wednesday morning, recovery team began contacting other SABW offices to locate
surplus equipment - PCs, desks, telephones, etc. - that could be used to help equip an alternate
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New York office location. The firm's PC vendor was also contacted and arrangements were
made to ship several hundred workstations within the week.
By end of day Wednesday, the tapes had arrived in Chicago and the data restoration process had
begun, starting with the e-mail server. All internet mail was then re-directed to the new domain
and voice mail accounts were established on an alternate system. By Friday afternoon, a
restored document management system was available to New York users and office equipment
began arriving at the alternate office location. Throughout the weekend, SABW's IT team
worked feverishly to set up phones, network equipment, printers, desks, and PCs at the New
York site. At 10 a.m., the firm assembled all New York personnel for a briefing and by noon,
they all reported for work at the alternate site. SABW's New York office was fully functional
and virtually all firm data was restored. The firm would remain in the temporary location until
the following July 4 th weekend before moving into a permanent home in mid-town Manhattan.
For all intents and purposes, SABW performed brilliantly in the face of the September 1 1 th
tragedy. The firm was never really "down", their clients were impressed, and most importantly,
all of their people were safe. Several key success factors made this possible. First, their
disciplined approach to backing up their data significantly reduced their exposure to extensive
data loss. Because they backed up daily and stored their tapes offsite, their data was never older
than one day and was far enough away so as not to be compromised by the disruption. Had
SABW stored their tapes in the South Tower of the World Trade Center for example, recovery
would have been much more difficult. Ms. Heath-Porter also points out that maintaining
standardized hardware - including network configurations, PC's, and telephones - with standard
images dramatically improved their ability to make a rapid recovery (Heath-Porter, 2002). A
third key for SABW was the degree to which they planned for and practiced recovering systems
under disaster scenarios. While they certainly never anticipated a plane hitting their building,
they didn't have to. If well-conceived, basic disaster recovery practices are applicable to
virtually any scenario; the source of the disruption is irrelevant. What is relevant is that
employees understand what their responsibilities are should disaster strike and be able to
implement basic recovery plans "in their sleep" (Heath-Porter, 2002). In simplest terms, SABW
was successful because they were prepared. They had a sound recovery plan and an able and
determined staff to execute that plan and make adjustments as the situation called for.
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5.2.3 Supply Disruption
This failure mode applies when an organization may not have been directly impacted by the
event, one or more of its key suppliers was. And a company can't produce if it doesn't have the
required component parts or subassemblies in the right place at the right time. Figure 31.0 below
describes the impact of such a disruption on the flow of physical goods and/or information
throughout the generic supply network. In addition, two cases - Dole Vs. Chiquita and Dell Vs.
Apple - are outlined below to provide accounts of how this type of failure mode can occur, what
it means for a firm, and how four such firms responded.
Figure 31.0 - Potential Impact of Supply Disruption
Supplier(s) Manufacturer(s) Warehouse(s)/DC(s) Retail Outlet(s) Customer(s)
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5.2.3.1 Dole Vs. Chiquita - 10/22/98 - Hurricane Mitch
When Hurricane Mitch wreaked havoc on much of Central America in October 1998, it
destroyed roads, bridges, railroad tracks, factories, houses.. .and banana plantations. Of the
reported 50% loss to Honduras' agricultural crops - 70% of its total economic output - bananas
were especially hard hit. Mitch had claimed 10% of the worldwide crop. According to Martha
& Subbakrishna's (2002) paper, when the rains finally relented, Dole had lost an estimated 70%
of its 40,000 acres in Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua; roughly of its total global
production. Chiquita Brands also suffered, losing an estimated $200M in expected output from
its 40+ farms located in the affected regions (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002). While these two
leading global banana producers lost most of their Central American capacity, they each reacted
quite differently to the disaster - producing very different results.
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Once the impact of the disaster was known, Chiquita immediately implemented a plan to locate
and leverage alternate sources of supply in the region. To make up for the lost crops, they
increased production at other locations and purchased fruit from associate producers in areas that
were not affected by Mitch. Dole, on the other hand, had no strategy in place for alternate
sourcing and suffered an interruption in Central American supply for over a year. The end result
for Chiquita was a 4% increase in fourth quarter (1998) revenues, while Dole suffered a 4%
decline in revenues and was forced to take a special charge of $1 GOM for the same period. This
is a classic example of two firms with identical businesses that reacted very differently when
faced with identical disruptive circumstances. Because Chiquita had secondary sources of local
supply, Martha & Subbakrishna attest, it was able to successfully avert the prolonged and
expensive supply gap that haunted Dole for the entire following year (Martha & Subbakrishna,
2002).
5.2.3.2 Dell Vs. Apple - 09/21/99 - Taiwan Earthquake
When an earthquake rocked Chi-Chi, Taiwan on September 21, 1999, the widespread loss of
power coupled with the physical damage to the manufacturing facilities of several major
semiconductor suppliers disrupted the flow of components to many PC and laptop OEMs for
several weeks. Two leading computer makers, Apple and Dell, were equally affected yet reacted
quite differently to the supply crunch.
According to Martha & Subbakrishna (2002), the earthquake presented Apple Computer with an
immediate shortage of semiconductors and other critical components for both its iBook laptop
and G4 desktop product lines. And the delay couldn't have come at a worse time as both were
relatively new on the market and demand had been growing steadily over the recent weeks.
Apple responded by shipping a slower version of the G4, but relented when the move generated
an avalanche of customer complaints. The problem persisted into the 4 th quarter as the company
was unable to modify the configurations of previously ordered models. Most customers
responded by either ordering lower margin machines instead or canceling their Apple orders
altogether.
Dell, on the other hand, weathered the storm much better. Although their famously lean build-
to-order operating strategy meant that they held only five days of inventory, their "sell-what-
you-have" sales model allowed them to direct customers to products for which they could build
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with available components. The inherent nature of their build-to-order system also prevented
them from experiencing the same "hard-configuration" issues that hurt Apple. Instead of losing
customer sales and disappointing customers, Dell actually thrived, achieving higher 3rd quarter
earnings over the previous year by 41% (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002).
5.2.4 Manufacturing Disruption
In this scenario, a firm's ability to produce goods or provide services is compromised by a
disruption in the supply chain that directly impacts its manufacturing assets. This could also
apply to an outsource situation where a 3rd-party contract manufacturer was impacted. For
examples, a fire or hurricane at one or more production facilities could significantly diminish a
firm's manufacturing capacity, disrupting both upstream and downstream supply chain
operations. Figure 32.0 below describes the impact of such a disruption on the flow of physical
goods and/or information throughout the generic supply network. In addition, two examples -
Unilever and Compaq - are discussed below and provide accounts of how this type of failure
mode can occur, what it means for a firm, and how two such firms have either responded or
shielded themselves from future manufacturing disruptions.
Figure 32.0 - Potential Impact of Manufacturing Disruption
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5.2.4.1 Unilever - 10/28/98 - Hurricane Mitch
According to Martha & Subbakrishna (2002), when Hurricane Mitch swept through Central
America in 1998, a Unilever suffered extensive damage to a manufacturing facility in Puerto
Rico that produced roughly half of the North American supply of Q-Tip brand cotton swabs. As
a result, they lost two weeks of production and forced many of customers into stock-out
situations. Despite this experience, Unilever chose to re-locate 100% of its Q-Tip production
back to the Puerto Rico facility after repairs were made. To mitigate their exposure to similar
disruptions to production, they increased inventory levels in North America by 10%. They also
arranged contracts with barge shippers in the event that road or rail systems were made
unavailable. In this case, while Unilever chose to consolidate manufacturing in a single location,
likely to take advantage of attractive labor costs and economies of scale, they introduced learned
from their experience from Hurricane Mitch and introduced new means to mitigate their risk of
future disruptions (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002).
5.2.4.2 Compaq Computer - General Best Practices
To mitigate the risk of lost production due to supply chain disruptions, Martha & Subbakrishna
(2002) attest, Compaq implemented a formal business continuity plan that includes the ability to
shift production to different parts of the world. Compaq has assembly facilities in Europe, North
America, South America, and Asia, and can quickly shift production between them in response
to extreme weather or political strife, for example, might affect one or more regions. The plan
also requires a secondary supplier for all critical components and recommends that foreign
suppliers have secondary facilities within the United States (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002).
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5.2.5 Transportation/Distribution Disruption
In many cases, each node in the network may not have been directly impacted mode, but the
organization's ability to transport raw materials, WIP, and/or finished goods from one node to
another may still be vulnerable. For example, a transportation service provider could suddenly
go out of business, a port could close, or a terrorist attack could effectively close one or more
borders. All of these could, and have in the past, severely compromise a fin's ability to move
materials from point A to point B and hence effectively run its business. Figure 33.0 below
describes the impact of such a disruption on the flow of physical goods and/or information
throughout the generic supply network. In addition, five cases - Rocket Air USA, Continental
Teves, Ford Vs. Daimler-Chrysler, Toyota/GM NUMMI, and Dow Coming - are outlined
below to provide accounts of how this type of failure mode can occur, what it means for a firm,
and how several such firms responded.
Figure 33.0 - Potential Impact of Transportation Disruption
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5.2.5.1 Rocket USA Inc. - 08/04/97 - 1997 UPS Strike
Headquartered in Forest Park, IL, Rocket USA is a marketer of toys, games and collectibles that
feature characters from cartoons like Futurama and The Simpsons. In the space of just a few
short months during the summer of 1997, the 5-person start-up company had done virtually
everything that it could to prepare for its first product launch. According to Ruberry's 1998
article in Entrepreneur magazine, all that was left was to sign the contract with a Japanese
company that would be the sole distributor for a line of collectible windup toys, including the
robot from the original "Lost in Space" television series (Ruberry, 1998). Michael Perry, the
company's President and Co-founder had planned for everything, or so he thought. Just as
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C.O.D. orders began to stream in and the first inventory of robots filled the warehouse, UPS
declared a company-wide labor strike that effectively brought all operations to a grinding halt.
While the shutdown proved to be a major inconvenience for many small businesses, it was a
catastrophic disaster for Rocket. The struggling start-up did not have accounts with alternate
carriers and quickly discovered that many carriers would accept business only from current
customers. Says Perry: "We were totally in the dark about how we were going to ship. We had
to hand-carry orders to the post office [because] we really had no backup plan" (Ruberry, 1998).
Rocket USA's experience should serve as an important lesson for other small business owners.
While supply chain disruptions can certainly be damaging for large businesses, small operations
are even more susceptible and can be forced out of business by even a minor crisis. The margin
for error is often razor thin for cash-strapped businesses trying to establish themselves in an
increasingly competitive marketplace. Rocket was able to weather the UPS storm and took
valuable lessons from the harrowing experience. They quickly transitioned to a much more
diverse distribution system with enough contingency shipping relationships to ensure that orders
flow smoothly even if one of the major were to strike.
5.2.5.2 Continental Teves - 09/11/01 - Terrorist Attack
As the management team of Continental Teves, a tier-i supplier to the auto industry, monitored
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks from their headquarters in Auburn Hills, MI, they
quickly realized that global supply chain operations would be significantly affected. A crisis
team, comprised of purchasing and logistics managers, was immediately assembled to determine
the magnitude of the disruption. As outlined in Martha & Subbakrishna's 2002 paper, they first
assembled a list of customers, parts, and supplier orders outstanding. Next, they identified where
each order came from, whether or not it was deemed critical, and whether or not it was
vulnerable to delay from the quickly deteriorating U.S. transportation environment. By the
afternoon, they had identified all North American shipments that required immediate attention,
expediting many of those via ground transportation. For parts sourced from overseas, the crisis
team leveraged existing contingency plans with its carriers to expedite some scheduled and
planned using air transport. Continental's quick response and comprehensive impact assessment
allowed it to deliver with minimal disruption over the weeks following the attacks (Marsh &
Subbakrishna, 2002).
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5.2.5.3 Ford vs. Daimler-Chrysler - 09/11/01 - Terrorist Attack
The aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks included an immediate and dramatic
increase in security at all customs points along the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico. Air
traffic was also brought to a standstill for several days; several weeks would pass before the
government permitted carriers to resume unrestricted operations. These actions, as necessary as
they may have been for national security, resulted in long delays at border crossings for many
weeks after the attacks. The delays significantly disrupted the flow of goods across North
America, wreaking havoc on the just-in-time inventory systems implemented by many
industries, particularly the large auto makers, over the past twenty years. To minimize inventory
carrying costs, attest Martha & Subbakrishna (2002), companies like Ford and Daimler-Chrysler
depended on the frequent replenishment of components and sub-assemblies to maintain a steady
rate of production. If the right parts were not in the right place at the right time, the assembly
line would come to a screeching halt, costing millions of dollars in idle resources and lost
production capacity. For Ford Motor Company, this unfortunately became the case in the days
and weeks following September 1 1 th. As shipments of engines and drive-train parts became
stalled at the Canadian border, Ford quickly exhausted any on-site inventory it may have been
carrying and was eventually forced to idle five of its U.S. plants. As a result, Ford produced
13% fewer vehicles than planned for the fourth quarter of 2001 (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002).
Daimler-Chrysler, however, showed that proper planning and sound execution can go a long way
in minimizing the impact of even the most severe of supply chain disruptions. By September
12 th, the company's Michigan-based logistics staff had conducted a comprehensive analysis of
their production flow and identified all parts movements (in-transit shipments, open orders, etc.)
that warranted immediate attention. When the team realized that they would be running
dangerously low on an updated steering-gear unit for the Ram pickup truck, they team
intervened to arrange an alternate means of shipping. Normally, the part is air-shipped from a
TRW plant in Virginia to a Chrysler assembly plant in Mexico. To minimize the potential delay,
they worked with the supplier and arranged for the parts to be transported via an expedited truck
service. In this case, there was not much that either company could do beforehand to anticipate
the temporary collapse of the entire U.S. transportation industry. The difference came, however,
in how each company reacted to the disruption. Daimler-Chrysler acted immediately to
determine their exposure while Ford did not seem to exhibit the same sense of urgency and
managerial discipline. And once Daimler-Chrysler made the decision to act, they already had
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the tools in place that provided the supply chain visibility and control that they needed to
accurately assess and react to the situation.
5.2.5.4 Toyota/GM NUMMI Plant - 09/29/02 - Port Lockout
By the time a labor dispute finally closed down the 29 ports that line the coast of the western
United States, most businesses had over three months to plan for the disruption and arrange for
alternate shipping arrangements; some even longer. According to a story printed in the Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, Limited Brands - operators of Limited, Express, and Victoria's Secret - had been
preparing for over nine months. The apparel retailer re-routed several ocean shipments to Miami
and secured capacity with air carriers that it was able to quickly transition to when port closures
became imminent (Star-Bulletin, 2002). Wal-Mart Stores also took steps to shield its business
from disruption. Tom Williams, a company spokesman, stated that "[they] had accelerated
deliveries" to build up safety stocks and reduce their dependency on the frequent deliveries that
characterizes their steady-state inventory strategy. A Salomon Smith Barney report confirmed
this by noting that the world's largest retailer had three to five weeks of inventory stocked at its
store locations and distribution centers in anticipation of the port shutdown (Star-Bulletin, 2002).
Some businesses, however, did not heed the warnings and did not take steps to adequately
protect their operations as companies like Limited and Wal-Mart had. Fremont, CA-based New
United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI), a joint venture assembly plant owned by General
Motors (GM) and Toyota, was one of those businesses.
At the time, the NUMMI plant was the only major vehicle production line west of the
Mississippi where it assembled the Chevrolet Prizm, the Toyota Corolla, and the Toyota
Tacoma. Typically, 34 containers of car (8) and truck parts (26) would arrive at the port of
Oakland every day where they would be unloaded and trucked the 40 miles to the NUMMI
factory for immediate use. When the Port of Oakland was closed on Sunday, September 2 9th
2002 in response to the breakdown in negotiations between the Pacific Maritime Association and
the International Longshore & Warehouse, the flow of containers suddenly became anything but
typical. Until the ports were re-opened ten days later, NUMMI's engines, transmissions, and
vehicle frames would sit idle in cargo bays at the Port of Oakland or on ships anchored off the
coast of Northern California.
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As quoted by Sarker in a 2002 article, according to plant spokesman Michael Damer, "NUMMI
stopped the truck production line at 11:25 p.m. [the following] Wednesday and stopped
assembling General Motors and Toyota cars about an hour later" (Sarker, 2002). Workers were
simply unable to finish assembling vehicles together as they waited for out of stock components.
Plant operations ground to a halt, idling roughly 5,500 employees with an annual payroll of
$300M. While NUMMI certainly had ample time to anticipate the port closure, their Just-In-
Time inventory strategy would not permit them to carry excess inventory and the considerable
cost of air-freight made them reluctant to commit to that alternative until they absolutely had to.
One freight company told BBC News Online that the difference between shipping and air-
freighting cargo averaged $53,000 per container. And according to a NUMMI spokesman, air-
freight "would increase production costs of the cars by $300 to $600 each, and the trucks by
$2,000 apiece" (Sarker, 2002). They eventually did opt to charter several 747s to bring parts in
from Japan, but only for the car assembly line as the option was viewed as cost prohibitive for
truck assembly. Because shipping contracts were not arranged prior to the shutdown, NUMMI
was forced to pay inflated rates due to the heavy demand. They also waited until one week after
the Port of Oakland closed before air-freighting the much-needed inventory, hoping that the
labor dispute would be resolved quickly. It didn't and they were forced to endure a week of
production downtime.
The production lines at NUMMI eventually did come back to life, first with the 40 air-freighted
containers of car parts, then with the containers of car and truck parts that began arriving when
the port lockout was finally resolved ten days after it started. With overtime and extra shifts, the
plant was however able to recover all of the lost production. According to a 2003 NUMMI press
release, the joint venture boasted its highest production ever - 369,856 vehicles - in 2002.
President Kanji Ishii noted that "it was a record-breaking year despite three major model
launches and a port lockout" (NUMMI Press Release, 2003). While it is certainly impressive
that they automaker was able to make up the production loss, they incurred significant expense
in doing so. While NUMMI did not disclose their financial losses due to the port lockout, the
additional shipping costs, costs of production downtime, and overtime costs once the plant re-
opened, are estimated in the tens of millions of dollars.
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5.2.5.5 Dow Corning Corp. - 03/20/03 - 2003 U.S.-Iraq War
In the months leading up to the 2003 U.S.-Iraq war, logistics experts at Dow Coming Corp., the
U.S. chemical conglomerate, was busy analyzing global supply chain for potential vulnerabilities
to disruption. According to the Wall Street Journal, Dow makes over 10,000 deliveries per
month to 20,000 customers in 50 countries and depends on a supply base that is just as diverse
and far-flung. As the slightest glitch can disrupt the company's complex and streamlined supply
chain, Dow understands that "elaborate emergency plans have become an operational necessity
(Kahn, 2003). So when the first shots were fired on March 20, 2003, Dow Coming was ready.
In the case of the U.S.-Iraq conflict, the Suez Canal was determined to be the likely bottleneck
and the biggest potential headache for Dow. In one case, supplies were shipped from Belgium to
a finishing plant in Shanghai 12 days early to allow routing around the Cape of Good Hope
instead of through the canal. As a general precaution, extra shipping containers were also
arranged at ports along the U.S. East Coast to prevent delays in the event of a sudden shortage.
Additional inventory was also placed at key storage areas at Dow facilities across the globe to
provide insulation from shipping delays.
Dow's team of schedulers and planners began meeting to discuss the potential logistics impact of
a prolonged conflict with Iraq months before the threat of war became imminent, and started
implementing countermeasures two months before the first shots were fired. Once the conflict
began, this proactive approach allowed the team to spend much of their time checking
assumptions and updating operating plans based on the rapidly changing global conditions. One
condition that the team was especially sensitive to pertained to the potential strain on global
shipping that the U.S. military could create by absorbing capacity to re-supply troops in the
Middle East; a lesson learned during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. So many commercial container
ships were diverted to the Middle East that tracking shipments became difficult and guaranteeing
delivery at the proper destination became nearly impossible.
While Dow concedes that advances in information technology have made them much better
prepared to deal with the situation this time around, customers have also become much more
demanding and less tolerant of delays, regardless of the cause, because their own lean operating
strategies have made them all the more dependent on timely deliveries. It is clear that Dow
understands the Efficiency-Resiliency tradeoff that faces most companies operating today, and
are proactive in their efforts to restore the proper balance to their own supply chain operations.
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5.2.6 Demand Disruption
And even if firm's ability to manufacture and distribute its products suffers no direct or indirect
impact from a disruptive event, it still must rely on its customers' ability to receive and pay for
those products. In this scenario, one or more key customers were indeed impacted. This often
results in a ripple effect that reaches far back into the supply chain. Figure 34.0 below describes
the impact of such a disruption on the flow of physical goods and/or information throughout the
generic supply network. In addition, two cases - GHSP and Cantor Fitzgerald - are outlined
below to provide accounts of how this type of failure mode can occur, what it means for a fmn,
and how three such finns responded.
Figure 34.0 - Potential Impact of Demand Disruption
Supplier(s) Manufacturer(s) Warehouse(s)/DC(s) Retail Outlet(s) Customer(s)
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5.2.6.1 GHSP - 09/11/01 - Terrorist Attack
Founded in 1924 and headquartered in Grand Haven, Michigan, GHSP (formerly known as
Grand Haven Stamping Products) is a leading Tier-1 supplier of mechanical and electro-
mechanical assemblies to the automotive industry. A vast majority of its business comes from
designing and manufacturing floor-mounted shifting mechanisms for large OEMs like Daimler-
Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Toyota, and Nissan.
When North American border traffic was ground to a halt following the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, several critical parts shipments bound for several Ford manufacturing
plants were stopped cold trying to enter the United States from Canada. When Ford's lean Just-
In-Time inventory of these critical parts was exhausted, the company was forced to temporarily
close six assembly lines, halting production on popular models like the Ford Thunderbird.
According to Ericson's 2001 article, the disruption quickly rippled through Ford's supply chain,
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"creating a chain-reaction train wreck among a host of suppliers who also operate on a zero-
inventory basis" (Ericson, 2001). Because Ford no longer accepts any parts deliveries when a
line is down, even those suppliers not directly impacted by the event were profoundly affected.
Although GHSP delivers by local truck routes, Ford would not accept delivery of its products
until shipments from its Mexico and Canada-based suppliers could get through and the assembly
line(s) could be re-started.
Well into October, 2001, floor shifters for the new Ford Thunderbirds remained stacked up on
GHSP's shop floor. When Ford shut down, the shifters that they were scheduled to ship that day
just got put off to the side, taking up precious floor space. There was not much that they could
do except to notify its own suppliers, as Ford would not take delivery. Most of their customers
will notify GHSP to inform them to hold shipments when disruptions occur, but that is not
always the case. Their large OEM customers exert the power in the supply chain and the various
Tier-1 and Tier-2 suppliers must be flexible enough to react accordingly. "Jeffrey McCauley,
Manager of Information Systems at GHSP, also points out that it doesn't take as much as a
terrorist attack to knock Ford offline. GHSP recently waited for weeks for a fix to a cooling fan
fault by another supplier that had idled a Ford assembly line. Since GHSP operates three plants
for various customers, the best it can do is re-allocate resources while the supply chain gets back
in order" (Ericson, 2001). In the modem JIT-based extended supply chain, prevalent in
technology-intensive industries like automotive and consumer electronics, a disruption for one is
a disruption for all.
5.2.6.2 Cantor Fitzgerald - 09/11/01 - Terrorist Attack
When terrorist attacks brought about the collapse of New York City's World Trade Center on
September 11 th, the many financial services firms that called the twin towers home suffered
numerous casualties and massive property damage. Cantor Fitzgerald, a leading U.S. Treasury
bond broker, was the hardest hit of them all. In total, the firm lost 680 of its 1,000 New York-
based employees; every one of Cantor's traders in the international, Nasdaq, and program
trading groups died. The firm was however, left with 1,450 employees, including several key
players in the firm's large London office and a cadre of New York staff who survived. To
mobilize resources and prepare the firm for a recovery, Howard Lutnick, Cantor's long-time
CEO, closed offices in Paris and Frankfurt, and transferred staff to London. Said Lutnick in a
2001 New York Metro News article, "We played with the cards the terrorists left us" (Gordon,
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2001). But most importantly, and to the awe of Wall Street and most government regulators,
they were able to restore their U.S. eSpeed operations - a crucial link in the Treasury markets -
within two days after the attack. Against all odds, the firm was mounting a comeback.
Cantor Fitzgerald's primary business was trading United States treasury bonds and provided a
critical service to many large banks and insurance companies. That service was anonymity. It
provided financial institutions with the ability to execute large trades without letting competing
firms know what they were up to. The following example was presented by Shawn Tully in a
2001 Fortune article: "When a bank asks Merrill Lynch to unload $1 billion of Treasury bonds,
Merrill uses Cantor to break the order into pieces. That keeps other customers or dealers, like
Salomon, from knowing that a big block of bonds is hitting the market. If Merrill called Salomon
directly, Salomon might dump its own bonds first, pushing down the price when Merrill sold.
Cantor dominates the business because it serves so many clients; it can quickly find buyers, at
low cost, for even $3 billion sell orders. It's practically an exchange itself: The world's bond
traders use Cantor's quotes to establish the price of Treasuries. And investors use Cantor's screen
to make sure dealers aren't ripping them off' (Tully, 2001).
With many billions of dollars at stake on any given trade, the relationship between a customer
and his broker was historically very important. In fact, Cantor Fitzgerald had built its business
on the ability of its brokers to build and sustain such relationships with its customers, especially
the large institutional investors that literally moved the markets on a daily basis. In Mark Kahn's
2001 NetRisk.com article, they were characterized as a "2 0 th century equivalent of the craftsman
of Old England - and its workforce, composed of family and friends, mimicked that of any guild.
While [their] brokers were employed in a brokerage "factory," each developed a relationship
with his or her accounts based on his or her personality and ability to execute trades in the chaos
of Cantor's trading rooms" (Kahn, 2001). In a business like Cantor's, the brokers and the
personal relationships that they maintained with their customers were critical to the firm's ability
to earn generate revenue. That said, the human loss that Cantor Fitzgerald suffered on the
morning of September 1 1 th, 2001, should, for all intents and purposes, have put the firm out of
business. Due to several factors however, most the result of efforts made long before September
11 ,Cantor has managed to defy the odds and remains a viable competitor in the global bond
markets.
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Cantor's greatest stroke of luck had been its recent transition away from the broker-based, high-
touch relationship investing that it had built its business on and towards a more automated
operating model. Throughout the 1990's, Cantor, like other brokerage firms, started to shift to
an electronic platform for brokering - an internal electronic trading arm that the firm called
eSpeed. Instead of a static computer screen and a direct phone line to a broker, a trader executed
his or her trades directly from a computer keyboard without the assistance or advice of a
personal broker. In 1999, the fn began offering its clients a discount to switch from
traditional, over-the-phone broker-based trading to the eSpeed system. By September 10th,
eSpeed accounted for 80% of the firm's bond business (Tully, 2001). While many, including
Mark Kahn in his 2001 NetRisk.com article, argue that this transition runs exactly counter to
Cantor's historical competitive advantage and could ultimately undo its leadership position, it is
precisely what has allowed the firm, at least initially, to back from the destruction of its
headquarters and the death of so many of its traders and support staff (Tully, 2001). Because the
firm was able to restore its eSpeed operations so quickly - within just two days - they were able
to serve its customers when the U.S. markets re-opened on September 17th. And because they
had already successfully transitioned such a large proportion of its bond business (80%) to
eSpeed, Cantor had a critical mass of initial transaction volume that could sustain them as they
aggressively marketed their online services to their broker-based clients in an attempt to woo
them back or keep them from taking business elsewhere. It is important to note, however, that
the strength of their pre-September 11th broker relationships is playing a critical role in the
recovery as well. According to Kahn, "the anecdotal stories told in various articles and heard on
trading floors argue that Cantor might just survive based on the personal relationships its clients
had with those same brokers that Cantor was trying to eliminate. Traders, out of a loyalty to
their deceased brokers/friends and their families want to see Cantor survive" (Kahn, 2001).
The Cantor Fitzgerald case provides an interesting perspective on the devastating impact that a
demand-side supply chain disruption can have. While Cantor certainly had many obstacles to
overcome in term of general property damage, destruction of IT assets/infrastructure assets, and
loss of life, it is the disruption of the communication links between the firm and its customers
that this was focused on here. The lesson is twofold. First, relying completely on personal
relationships for recurring sales can be hazardous to a firm's health in the event of a disaster like
September 1 1th. Had Cantor not begun the transition to an online trading platform prior to the
attack, they firm would most likely not have been able to mount a comeback. This does not
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mean however, that a firm should rely completely on technology. For some commodity
industries, this may make sense. But for a financial services firm like Cantor Fitzgerald,
personal relationships between a company and its customers can be very important. Without
both of these elements working in their favor, Cantor Fitzgerald would not be in business today.
96
Chapter 6: Supply Chain Resilience Strategies
6.1 General Observations and Conclusions
A primary theme of this thesis has been the importance of focusing not on the nature of any
specific disruption, but on how business operations are likely to be generally impacted. That is
to say, organizations should focus on the failure modes, not the failures themselves. Firms
cannot foresee every potential threat, let alone the probability of it occurring at each point in a
complex and rapidly expanding supply network. It simply isn't feasible, nor would it be
practical. Fortunately, firms should not have to. As the numerous events and case studies
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 showed, a wide variety of disruptions tend to have very similar
effects on a company's supply chain. Therefore, a single all-encompassing supply chain
resilience strategy can be used to prepare for myriad future disruptions, whether natural or man-
made. This was the first of two major insights made clear by the research data.
The second major insight pertains to how firms approach resilience or business continuity
investments. When crafting an enterprise supply chain resilience strategy, it may be useful to
frame investment decisions as a question of risk vs. reward, terms that are very familiar to most
business managers. Using this framework, an organization would temper every risk
management investment decision with the expected reward of mitigating that risk, much like
hedging an investment portfolio. This ensures that managers take into account both sides of the
risk-reward equation. It also grounds the process with a common framework that is familiar to
most decision-makers, thus reducing the uncertainty and discomfort that topics like global
terrorism, killer earthquakes, or devastating hurricanes may stir.
In addition to these two insights, ten recurring themes became evident throughout the analysis of
the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5. These themes highlight lessons that companies like
Toyota, Unilever, Dow, Nokia, and Daimler-Chrysler had to learn the hard way. Each theme is
discussed in detail throughout the rest of Chapter 6.
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6.2 Lessons Learned: 10 Steps to a More Resilient Supply Chain
6.2.1 Build a Resilient Culture!
One of the most effective ways to enhance overall resiliency is to build it into the culture of the
organization. Just as quality or safety can be embedded into the cultural fabric, the notion of
resiliency can be made integral to the identity of an organization in much the same way. By
bringing resiliency to the forefront and aligning the organization to a common strategy,
managers can dramatically improve their chances of overcoming disruptions, regardless of the
root cause. This is the single most powerful tool to maximize supply chain resiliency and can
pay enormous dividends over time. As shown in the Nokia Vs. Ericsson case, it can even be the
edge that allows one firm to weather the same storm that forces ones of its largest competitors
out of the market.
The first step in building a resilient culture is learning to be constantly watchful for potential
disruptions. This notion pertains to security threats and supply chain anomalies in the same
manner. Recall that it was Nokia's quick recognition of a blip in the supply of chips from
Philips that allowed them to get a jump on Ericsson, capturing all excess supply capacity before
Ericsson even realized there was a problem. Timely detection of the disruption is the first step to
a successful recovery. And once a potential problem is detected, employees should be
encouraged and rewarded for communicating bad news quickly. This notion of information
velocity was a key success factor in several cases including Land Rover and Continental-Teves.
And once a disruption is detected, all parties in the supply chain must be notified to allow a
holistic response, be it identifying alternate sources for a key component, as in Nokia Vs.
Ericsson, stocking shelves with alternative product, or modifying promotional practices so that in
the worst case, the company is not promoting what it does not have and in the best case, it is
directing customers to the products that it does have, as in the Dell vs. Apple case. It is also
important to understand that this type of open, holistic, and uninterrupted communication can
have enormous collateral benefits as well. By breaking down the silos that tend to divide the
functional nodes of a supply chain and encouraging open and free-flowing collaboration,
enterprises will be much better positioned to operate as a globally-optimizing whole rather than a
scattered array of locally-optimizing nodes.
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6.2.2 Expect to Fail
For many of the cases profiled in Chapter 5, a prudent and comprehensive disaster plan, more
than anything else, made the difference between success and failure. For companies like the
Merrill Lynch, Oklahoma Federal Employee Credit Union (FECU), the New York Board of
Trade (NYBOT), and Nokia, operational disruptions are a foregone conclusion. In terms of
disaster planning, the question was never whether or not a disruption would occur, but when.
And it was exactly because these firms expected to fail that they were able to respond so well
when disaster struck.
Recall that when terrorists brought down the twin towers of the World Trade Center on
September 11 th, 2001, Merrill Lynch suddenly found itself without its world headquarters. But
general preparedness, sound contingency planning, and disciplined testing allowed the firm to
absorb the shock and return to normal operations while barely skipping a beat. According to
Paul Honey, Director of Global Contingency Planning, "the financial firm was able to
successfully evacuate their headquarters and resume critical management functions within
minutes of the terrorist attack"(Ballman, 2002). Almost immediately after the first plane struck,
the company's emergency management jumped into action and initiated the evacuation process.
And "within just a few minutes of the evacuation, Merrill Lynch was able to switch its critical
management functions to their command center in New Jersey, explained Honey. Since the
command center had been pre-designated in corporate-wide contingency plans, all personnel
immediately knew where to dial into and transfer information. This allowed transactions
throughout the company's global offices to continue as usual" (Ballman, 2002). There was
never any question as to how the firm should respond, despite the tragic and horrific nature of
the disruption. They simply executed the failure plan.
Merrill Lynch was successful because they planned appropriately and executed brilliantly. It
cannot be stressed enough how important execution is in these situations. A sound recovery plan
is useless if not implemented properly. For example, in Texas City, dockworkers and rescue
personnel were ignorant to the danger of the situation and did not react appropriately. There was
a plan in place at the time that called for dangerously burning ships to be towed from harbor, but
that plan was not initiated until it was too late. The tugboat never arrived.
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When crafting a plan, a firm should try to be as "destructively creative" as possible when
brainstorming potential disaster scenarios. This means that they should consider the absolute
worst-case. While the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the Y2K scare motivated many
New York City companies to invest in a sound disaster recovery strategy, most were not
prepared for the breadth of the September 11th disaster. For example, when telecommunications
networks were suddenly crippled, a spike in mobile telephone traffic from concerned loved ones
coincided with the loss of a major telephone-switching station operated by Verizon.
Communication via these networks was significantly compromised. Most plans assumed that a
telecommunications infrastructure would be available to facilitate the execution of the recovery
plan.
On the same day, many firms also realized the folly of locating their backup data far from their
central operating locations. Having an alternate site with the backup data that is far enough
away to not be affected by the disaster is critical. However, some of the organizations affected
by the collapse of the twin towers had their backup data stored hundreds of miles away.
Unfortunately, the massive transportation problems following the attacks prevented the data
from being physically transported to where it could be put to use in a timely way. When air
traffic was halted in the days following the disaster, back-up data tapes and other equipment had
to be shipped via ground transportation, severely slowing the IT recovery process. Conversely,
several firms that had back-up locations in another building in the World Trade Center complex
realized the folly in locating sites too close together. Both primary and secondary sites were
destroyed (Wright, 2002).
While the process of disaster planning can be cumbersome and time-consuming, the payoff will
more than justify the expense when disaster strikes. And as every resilient enterprise knows,
disaster will strike. The question is not if, but when. As Merrill Lynch, NYBOT, and Nokia will
attest to, planning to fail is a winning strategy.
6.2.3 Centralize at your Own Risk
To reduce organizational complexity and achieve economies of scale, many firms have pursued a
strategy of asset centralization when designing and building out their supply chains. While this
practice often does lead to lower total costs, it also exposes the enterprise to a significant amount
of risk. For example, if a firm operates only one production facility and that facility is rendered
100
inoperable by any number of potentially disruptive events, the firm suddenly loses all ability to
manufacture its products. In some highly competitive industries, a disruption of this nature
could put a company out of business. On the other hand, if that same firm operated out of
multiple facilities, or even maintained some sort of contingency relationship with a contract
manufacturer, production volumes at the alternate location(s) could be ramped up to balance the
load until the damaged facility could be brought back online.
This notion of "centralization risk" is prevalent in many of the case studies presented in Chapter
5. Unilever experienced first-hand how risky it can be to operate out of a single manufacturing
location when Hurricane Mitch destroyed their Q-Tip plant in Puerto Rico. The idea also applies
to sourcing and procurement. In both the Land Rover and Avon Rubber cases for example,
several firms learned a painful lesson in the dangers of "putting all of their eggs in one basket"
by sourcing critical parts from a single supplier. While centralizing assets and consolidating
procurement contracts often makes perfect economic sense, these decisions must be made with a
full understanding of the risks involved. This means that firms should always temper the cost
savings from centralization with the estimated impact and recovery expense of a major
disruption. It is interesting to note that after the September 1 1th terrorist attacks, several New
York City firms are doing just that and de-centralizing their operations so that losing one office
building or one factory will not cause an interruption in their service to their customers. A 2002
Insurance Day article lists the following organizations as moving towards a more de-centralized
logistics strategy by re-locating operations that were originally centralized at the World Trade
Center:
> Morgan Stanley plans to move 2,000 of 16,000 employees to Westchester County.
> Goldman Sachs is moving equity trading to the New Jersey waterfront.
> Marsch & McLennan is relocating 1,100 employees to Hoboken, New Jersey.
While it may often be difficult to derive the optimal balance between a centralized and de-
centralized logistics strategy, the most important thing for organizations to remember is that
there is now an important tradeoff between cost and risk that must be included in the analysis.
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i6.2.4 Understand the Risks Inherent to Sole-Sourcing
As discussed in the previous section, the notion of "centralization risk" also applies to sourcing.
While single-sourcing components can be advantageous in many circumstances, it also
introduces a significant level of operational risk. Suppliers can go out of business, lose key
employees, or get acquired by another company - all very dangerous situations if that supplier
provides one or more key components that can bring production to a screeching halt if supply is
interrupted. In the situations where it does indeed makes sense for a firm to sole-source a key
component, contingency planning can be used to hedge its risk. A comprehensive supplier risk
management plan will require that a firm:
1. Identify all critical suppliers or service providers (carriers, contract ifrs., etc.)
2. Estimate the probability/frequency of a business failure or supply disruption
> Formal data collection: published financial data, SEC filings, etc.
> Informal data collection: own contacts with the company, frequent re-organizations?, etc.
3. Estimate the potential impact of a supply disruption
4. Evaluate current business relationship with supplier
> Are you making it difficult for the supplier to stay in business?
> Review the contract for disruption clauses, etc.
5. Monitor all critical suppliers on a regular basis
6. Contract with back-up suppliers to hedge risk where feasible and practical
> Compensate via either retainer fees or a minority percentage of regular volume
> Arrange for spikes in supply volumes in the event of disruption in primary supply
> Ensure that all operating links are in place to facilitate a rapid change-over if needed
Land Rover, Ericsson, and Avon's ill-fated OEM customer all learned painful lessons in the
dangers of consolidating supply to a single source. In all cases, significant supply crises arose
not only because these companies sole-source critical components, but also because they lacked
the visibility into their supplier's operations that may have allowed them to anticipate the both
the impact and the likelihood of such a disruption and develop an appropriate response plan
before they needed it. They simply were not prepared. It is also important to note that the
contingency planning process outlined in the six steps above can, and should, also be used to
evaluate sole-source relationships that may exist with transportation providers, contract
manufacturers, or other 3 d-party service providers.
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6.2.5 Know your Supply Chain!
While the importance of keeping a watchful eye on key suppliers was discussed in the previous
section, this idea also applies to other partners in the supply chain. It is not enough to ensure that
proper risk management strategies are implemented at your firm, you must also ensure that your
suppliers and partners are resilient. Enterprises should become intimately familiar with both the
capabilities and vulnerabilities of their partners. According to Chase Kushak, Senior Supply
Chain Product Manager at Covisint, "business processes and physical supply chains are different
elements that have to work in concert. Building plants right next to your supply base would be a
bit of a knee jerk. Just because your tier-one supplier is next to you, he still may be sourcing
parts from Mexico. The bottleneck just moves" (Ericson, 2001).
In Chapter 5, Nokia, Ericsson, Land-Rover, and Toyota all learned first-hand how vulnerable
their operations really were to disruptions suffered by supply partners. In each case, the situation
could have been prevented by proactively working with partners to understand their respective
risk profiles and implement contingency measures to protect themselves. While this certainly
assumes a high level of cooperation and trust between supply chain partners, that is what is
necessary to achieve true supply chain resiliency. For enterprises can no longer afford to keep
their proverbial heads in the sand, depending solely on negotiated supply contracts and blind
optimism.
6.2.6 Hedge Disruption Risk with Inventory Buffers
Inventory buffers, or safety stocks, can be a very effective tool for firms to use as a hedge for
various disruption risks. Extra inventory held at strategic locations throughout the supply chain
can dramatically improve a company's ability to weather events like supply shortages or a
sudden decrease in manufacturing capacity for instance. It basically provides a safety net that
will ensure that the supply chain can continue to function in the event that one of its critical
nodes is somehow impaired.
Examples of using inventory buffers as a risk management tool can be found in several of the
cases discussed in Chapter 5. When Unilever chose to continue to centralize manufacturing at a
single facility even after that facility was destroyed by Hurricane Mitch, they increased
inventory levels across their North American supply chain by 10%. This step was taken to
reduce their exposure to manufacturing disruption risk should disaster strike twice. So while the
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perceived risk did not drive them to de-centralize manufacturing, it did enter the logistics
analysis and drove them to take other steps to mitigate that risk. Another example can be found
in Dow Coming's preparations for the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War. When the threat of war became
imminent, Dow's logistics managers placed additional inventory at key storage areas at Dow
facilities across the globe to provide insulation from potential shipping delays.
Martha & Vratimos (2002) estimate that Just-In-Time (JIT) techniques have saved the auto
industry more than $1 B a year in inventory carrying costs alone over the past decade. While this
thesis certainly does not suggest a full retreat from JIT manufacturing and logistics principles, it
does recommend that the tradeoff between the cost of downtime or stock-outs and the cost of
carrying excess inventory be re-visited and analyzed in the context of the myriad supply chain
disruption risks that enterprises now face on a daily basis. The challenge then is to strike the
proper balance between Just-In-Time and Just-In-Case. This is certainly no trivial task as
decades of inventory optimization theory must now be modified to account for this loosely-
defined notion of disruption risk. And until the appropriate risk assessment techniques are
developed and the requisite optimization algorithms are improved, this tradeoff will likely have
to be managed with equal parts art and science. But just because a firm cannot quantify the risk
does not mean that it can afford to ignore it. The planning tools will eventually evolve, but
leading firms like Dow and Unilever are not waiting around. They recognize today's
increasingly risky operating environment and are using inventory buffers to protect themselves.
6.2.7 Develop Backup & Recovery Processes for All Data/IT Infrastructure.. .and Practice!
According to Meta Group, "companies deprived of key computer systems for 10 days cannot
recoup the financial damage, and 50% of them will go out of business within five years" (Meta,
February, 2002). In the new information economy, technology is king. Information technology
increasingly drives virtually every corporate function, from planning to manufacturing to sales.
And in industries like financial services and e-commerce, technology is the lifeblood of the
organization. If the computers go down, business ceases.
For this reason, it should not be a surprise to learn that in formation technology leads all other
corporate functions, by far, in terms of business continuity and disaster recovery planning,
information technology. After the Year 2000 (Y2K) frenzy and the 1993 and September 1 1th
terrorist attacks, it is now common practice to have comprehensive back-up and recovery plans
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in place for mission-critical corporate IT infrastructure. These are the plans that allowed Merrill
Lynch, Cantor Fitzgerald, and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (SABW), for example, to absorb
and respond so brilliantly to the September 1 1 th terrorist attacks. These firms had sound
recovery strategies in place and were prepared to implement them when it came time to do so.
And the best way to maximize preparedness, as all can attest to, is through testing.
For example, when a severe ice storm interrupted power at ING Property & Casualty's Saint-
Hyacinthe data center, a well-tested recovery plan allowed them to stay in business without
suffering any downtime whatsoever. As Rothstein (1998) observed in his review of the case,
testing was absolutely critical. "While everyone pays that lip service, where it becomes very
critical is in [disaster] situations like [the ice storm] where you build the relationship and rapport
between the organizations so that when the disaster happens, the supplier can provide useful
support. Exercising pays a lot of dividends" (Rothstein, 1998). Building strong relationships and
rapport through mutual exercises is the best way to ensure suppliers can provide useful support
when needed. Even the best IT recovery plan is useless if it cannot be implemented properly and
in a timely manner.
Again, we see that planning and execution are equally critical when responding to a disruptive
event. And one of the best ways to ensure proper execution when the time comes is through
comprehensive testing. As painful as testing can be for an organization, it is nothing compared
to the disastrous effects that prolonged downtime can have.
6.2.8 Implement Enterprise Standards
Implementing an enterprise standard for hardware, software, and processes makes a lot of sense,
especially in terms of disaster preparedness. If employees are all working on a standard
computing platform, the process of backing up critical systems and restoring those systems after
a disruptive event becomes much less painful. Enterprise standards also improve a firm's ability
to re-configure their operations quickly and efficiently if needed. For example, it becomes much
easier to transfer employees to alternate manufacturing locations in response to a disaster at a
primary plant if all plants are running on the same Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system.
Employees don't have to spend precious time trying to learn a system that they may not be
familiar with. This concept also applies to business processes like procurement, payroll, or
quality control.
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For Compaq, a consolidated product data management platform allows them to quickly transition
production from one plant to the other by ensuring that everyone is working off of a single
product specifications package (bill of materials, design drawings, etc.). In a second example,
when Dow Coming's team of planners and schedulers began meeting to determine the impact of
the pending 2003 U.S.-Iraq war, it was crucial that all team members were conducting analyses
and making decisions based on the same information. Because the company's entire delivery,
warehousing, and transportation network is run by a single SAP AG software platform, this
never became a problem. The process would have been very difficult, if not completely
infeasible, if each factory ran its own ERP system. A company-wide software standard also
facilitated SABW's recovery process following the destruction of their World Trade Center data
center and office locations on September 1 1 th, 2001. The entire system was recovered in a
matter of days with the same operating environment and applications that were present on
September 1 0 .
6.2.9 A Flexible Supply Chain is a More Resilient Supply Chain
Several of the cases presented in Chapter 5 also illustrate the benefits of a flexible supply chain.
Once a disruption was detected, managers were able to quickly and effectively take corrective
action within the supply chain to minimize the overall impact to operations. The first key to this
is detection, which is made possible with supply chain visibility. Visibility is facilitated both by
attentive and skilled employees and supply chain management tools. In the Nokia Vs. Ericsson
case, Nokia's ability to quickly detect the supply disruption allowed them to capture all of
Philips' alternate production capacity before Ericsson could, which put them in a much better
competitive position. And once visibility is achieved, it is supply chain control that allows
management to respond when disaster strikes. When a major earthquake disrupted the supply of
computer chips for both Apple and Dell in 1999, superior supply chain control gave Dell the
edge. Although their famously lean build-to-order operating strategy meant that they held only
five days of inventory, their "sell-what-you-have" sales model allowed them to direct customers
to products for which they could build with available components. The inherent nature of their
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build-to-order system also prevented them from experiencing the same "hard-configuration"
issues that hurt Apple. So in summary, when it comes to supply chain management:
.. . ....... K
6.2.10 Insure Wisely
As supply chains grow both in term of complexity and geography, it is crucial that firms subject
their existing insurance policies to a periodic review. As the global operating environment
evolves, risk profiles change and organizations can quickly become more or less vulnerable to
disruption. As a supplement to the property and casualty insurance commonly used by firms to
protect their assets from physical damage under a variety of circumstances, business continuity
insurance can be used to protect a firm in the event that a disruption occurs because of an event
outside the proverbial four walls of the company. While a firm may suffer no direct physical
damage to its asset base, a disruption elsewhere in the extended supply chain - perhaps at a key
supplier or contract manufacturer - could significantly impact operations. As one might expect,
the terrorist attacks of September 11th highlighted the need for comprehensive insurance
coverage. They also dramatically changed the face of an insurance industry that is still
struggling to incorporate the "new threat" of terrorist attacks into policies available to companies
operating on U.S. soil.
Before September 11h, "all risk" insurance was commonly used to insure policyholders against
business interruption when unforeseen events - hurricanes, earthquakes, industrial accidents,
terrorist attacks, etc. - disrupted either the inbound shipment of raw materials or the outbound
shipment of finished goods. September 11th, however, introduced a new sense of magnitude to
the potential loss calculations used by insurance companies to derive appropriate policy
premiums. It also introduced a new sense of uncertainty regarding the likelihood of future
attacks; the historical data commonly used to predict the future simply doesn't exist yet. The
major insurance providers have generally responded by stripping acts of terrorism from all-risk
policies, just as acts of war are commonly excluded. In November 2002, the U.S. government
passed legislation requiring major insurance companies to offer some form of terrorism
insurance to its business customers.
Terrorism insurance is now offered as a separate policy with much higher premiums derived
107
using geographic location as the primary indicator of risk, or the probability of suffering damage
due to a future terrorist attack. Risk modelers have concluded that, despite terrorist
organizations like al Qaeda's fluid nature, high-profile cities like New York and Washington
D.C. are more likely than others to be struck, which means companies in those areas should pay
times more for coverage. In fact, Newark-based Risk Management Solutions Inc. estimates that
only 2% of U.S. Zip Codes face more than 90% of the risk (Brady, 2003). Applying this
thinking, AIR Worldwide Corp., a subsidiary of Insurance Services Office Inc. (ISO) - the
company that sets rate guidelines for the industry - has helped ISO establish three tiers of risk.
As Figure 35.0 illustrates, the price points at each tier vary dramatically.
Figure 35.0 - Recommended 3-Tier Cost Structure of Terror Insurance
Th e Pr ice o f Ri sk Recommended cost of terror insurance*in city centers per $100,000 of coverage
TIER I TIER 2 TIER 3
New York, Chicago, Houston, Seattle, Rest of the
Washington D.C., Los Angeles, Country
San Francisco Philadelphia, Boston
$30 $18 $1
* Annual charge based on estimated cost of losses, excluding insurers' costs or added
Data: Insurance Services Office, Inc.
Source: Brady, 2003
As of April 2003, most companies are declining such insurance; either because they deem it
unnecessary, others because it's too expensive. "Insurers say that some companies are simply
counting on the government to bail them out if another attack occurs" (Brady, 2003). While
there was a slight spike in firms seeking supplemental terrorism coverage in the days leading up
to the U.S.-Iraq war, the data still indicates that the overwhelming response has been negative;
the extra costs remain far too high in proportion to the perceived risk for most companies.
For those companies that do choose to purchase supplemental terrorism coverage, it is crucial
that they review the policy terms in detail and understand precisely the terms of the contract, as
most insurers offer only coverage specifically mandated by the government's terrorism-coverage
bill. For example, federal coverage is limited only to terrorism perpetrated by foreign
perpetrators or groups. While this obviously leaves policyholders vulnerable to domestic
terrorism, it also introduces some uncertainty in the event that the government might not be able
to determine the nationality of a terrorist killed in an attack. In response, several insurers -
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including Ace, American Insurance Group Inc., and Lloyd's of London - offer coverage that
includes acts of domestic terrorism as well (Oster, 2003).
For those firms that were fortunate enough to have some form of business continuity insurance in
place prior to September 11th, many found their coverage was inadequate. This coverage
typically is triggered only if there is physical damage to a company's property. As widely
discussed, many businesses were shut down or lost money not because their properties were
damaged, but because air traffic was grounded, closing some airports for several days and
canceling moneymaking events like conventions and trade shows. Most of those companies took
learned this lesson the hard way and have since purchased broader business interruption
insurance policies that provide coverage beyond direct physical damage (Oster, 2003).
6.3 Summary of Lessons Learned
Terrorist attacks, natural disasters, political upheaval, and industrial accidents are nothing new -
most as old as commerce itself. But events like the Year 2000 (Y2K) computer upgrade frenzy,
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and even the West Coast port lock-out in the summer of 2002 have
brought the risks to the forefront of global consciousness. As described in Figure 36.0 below,
the rate of corporate investment in risk management and business continuity planning has
increased with the relative frequency of these significantly disruptive events.
Figure 36.0 - Milestones for Corporate Awareness of Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
09/11/01 03/20/03
September 11th U.S. - Iraq War
09/29/02
02/26/93 01/01/00 West Coast
'93 WTC Bombing Y2K Upgrades Port Lock-out
Increasing Corporate Investment in Risk Management and Contingency Planning
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It is not that disruptive events are necessarily occurring with any greater frequency or magnitude,
but that enterprises now find themselves increasingly vulnerable to their effects. For the past
two decades, there have been two major trends at work - Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing and
rapid globalization - that have led to this new reality. Organizations must now take decisive
action to address these new vulnerabilities and improve general supply chain resiliency. The
goal of this thesis project was to identify steps that firms can take to do just that. By studying a
wide range of past disruptions, several significant insights were gleaned.
Primary Insights:
> Organizations should focus on the failure modes, not the failures themselves. Firms cannot
foresee every potential threat, let alone the probability of it occurring at each point in a
complex and rapidly expanding supply network. It simply isn't feasible, nor would it be
practical. A single all-encompassing supply chain resilience strategy can be used to prepare
for myriad future disruptions, whether natural or man-made.
> When crafting an enterprise supply chain resilience strategy, it may be useful to frame
investment decisions as a question of risk vs. reward, terms that are very familiar to most
business managers. This ensures that managers take into account both sides of the risk-
reward equation. It also grounds the process with a common framework that is familiar to
most decision-makers, thus reducing the uncertainty and discomfort that topics like global
terrorism, killer earthquakes, or devastating hurricanes may stir.
Lessons Learned:
6.2.1 Build a Resilient Culture!
6.2.2 Expect to Fail
6.2.3 Centralize at your Own Risk
6.2.4 Understand the Risks Inherent to Sole-Sourcing
6.2.5 Know your Supply Chain!
6.2.6 Hedge Disruption Risk with Inventory Buffers
6.2.7 Develop Backup & Recovery Processes for All Data/IT Infrastructure... and Practice!
6.2.8 Implement Enterprise Standards
6.2.9 A Flexible Supply Chain is a More Resilient Supply Chain
6.2.10 Insure Wisely
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6.4 Opportunities for Further Study
While significant research has been initiated on the subject of supply chain resiliency and
disaster recovery, there is still much to be done. Much of the data collected at this point,
including the contents of this thesis, covers only a small subset of potentially available data. It
would be useful to somehow capture a larger sample size, which would allow more statistically
significant results. There is also much work to be done in the field of risk assessment and the
derivation of appropriate inventory levels for various levels of hedging. This pertains to Section
6.2.6 where the notion of using inventory buffers as a hedge for disruption risk was discussed.
Traditional inventory optimization algorithms should be modified to account for variable levels
of disruption risk. This would allow firms to craft inventory policies that incorporate a specified
level of risk that the firm is comfortable taking on. This would be similar to how the risk of
stocking out is incorporated into most traditional inventory models. Another subject that
warrants additional study is that of collateral benefits of supply chain resiliency and/or security
investments. Many firms underestimate the probability of a major disruption impacting their
operations. For these firms, it may be difficult to persuade management to make the appropriate
investments unless alternative benefits, such as decreased lead times or increased service levels,
can be identified.
Finally, the likelihood of future government mandates would be a useful area for many
companies to understand, particularly those in critical infrastructure industries or those
representing especially attractive targets for terrorist attacks. It remains uncertain as to what role
the U.S. government will eventually play in motivating organizations to address known
vulnerabilities, but the trend is certainly beginning to take shape. As described in the Wall Street
Journal (Schlesinger, 2003), the "Chemical Facilities Security Act" will impose a $250,000 fine,
and possibly an additional $50,000 per day, on any chemical production facility that is found to
be too relaxed in protecting itself against a terrorist attack. The bill would also permit the
Department of Homeland Security to sue any chemical plant and request a court order to close
the facility until the security threat is appropriately addressed. According the current draft of the
bill, all chemical plants would be required to draft a comprehensive security plan. While it is
still somewhat unclear as to how such legislation will be policed, it shows that both Democratic
and Republican lawmakers are willing to use government mandate to force the U.S. chemical
industry to close perceived security gaps, as opposed to leaving the issue for industry to address
on a voluntary basis. "This is a trend that is expected to continue for those commercial sectors
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deemed strategically important and/or likely targets of terrorist attack - power generation,
telecommunications infrastructure, oil refineries, etc." (Schlesinger, 2003).
6.5 General Conclusions
One of the things that this thesis hopes to make is that the world is becoming a much riskier
place for modem supply chain managers. Terrorist attacks, natural disasters, political upheaval,
and industrial accidents are disrupting operations on an unprecedented scale and frequency.
Trends like lean/JIT manufacturing and rapid globalization have exposed supply chains to
myriad new risks and rendered them highly susceptible to many types of disruptive events.
What this thesis also hopes to make clear is that no supply chain strategy can eliminate all of
these risks. And even if it could, it would be far too expensive for any firm to implement.
Organizations should instead focus on the general failure modes, rather than the failures
themselves. This approach allows for a single all-encompassing supply chain resilience strategy
that can be used to prepare for myriad future disruptions, whether natural or man-made.
The subject of insurance was also discussed in considerable detail. While the insurance industry
wrestles with the new problem of quantifying many of these new disruption risks, especially
those related to terrorist attacks, one thing is clear. Enterprises simply cannot rely on insurance
alone to protect themselves. In many cases, coverage may prove to be prohibitively expense or it
may not be available at all. This makes the use of operational supply chain resilience strategies
all the more important.
Outside of insurance, there is much that the modem supply chain manager can do to mitigate his
or her organization's exposure to disruption risk. The key lies in acquiring the awareness and
the capability to detect, quantify, and prepare for future disruptions. This leads to the various
resilience lessons outlined in Section 6.2. By identifying these lessons and presenting them here,
the goal is to provide managers with a body of work that enables them to learn from the
collective experiences of the firms profiled, and apply these lessons without first having to
endure the painful learning process. In other words, there is much to learn much from the past
that can help many firms prepare for the uncertain future. Because, as so appropriately stated by
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Figure 39.0 - Seismicity of the United States: 1977 - 1997
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Figure 42.0 - Total International Terrorist Attacks: 1981 - 2001
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Figure 44.0 - HydroQuebec Electrical Grid at Peak Ice Storm Conditions
Accumulation pendant les 5 jours do la pire tomp~te de verglas do lhIstolre du Qu6bec
I ftseau de transport de PdIectricitW au pire de la temp&te le 9-01-98 (entre 15 h 00.ot minult)
Source: HydroQuebec
www.hydroguebec.com
Note: Map shows the Quebec electrical grid on 01/09/98 between 3pm and midnight, when the stonn was
at its peak. The solid green lines represent functioning lines while the dotted red lines represent non-
functioning lines. The black triangles are main transformer stations and the blue areas indicate average
accumulated ice (mm).
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